Dissertation - Does John Austin Play Old Harry With The Fact Value Distinction?

Does John Austin Play Old Harry With The Fact / Value Distinction?

An investigation into the moral motivations of language.

Kyle Michael Sweet

April 2014

I, Kyle Michael Sweet, declare that all work found within this paper is composed by myself, and that the presented work is that of my own.

All work which is not entirely my own has been referenced in accordance with the system demanded by the university of Northampton.

Word Count: 8530

Date: 23 / 04 / 2014

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Does John Austin Play Old Harry With The Fact / Value Distinction?

An investigation into the moral motivations of language.

Chapter 1: Motivations and John Austin

It is not only worthy of note, but rather a necessity in understanding human actions, that our motivations are at the core of everything we do. With regard to this, it is completely within reason for testimony to be the greatest motivational force, for we wholeheartedly rely on the testimony of those we trust by means of advice, education and welfare in our everyday lives. The giving and taking of advice plays a fundamental place in such everyday things (i.e. friendships, professional practices, parenting, and so on), that nobody seems to be exempt from the influence of others. Predominantly, it seems to be the intention of giving advice that the person takes that advice and, therefore, carry out the advice given (Winch; Gingell: 2008). Even those in such a remote setting as a solitary hunter-gatherer tribe would learn by means of others when to stop running after a creature or which berries not to eat, despite nearly having caught the creature, or being very hungry, if it were not to benefit them. I believe it to be implausible for anyone from any walk of life to survive very long, or at least lead a healthy life, by purely relying on base desires and uninfluenced reason alone as their motivations.
It would seem, then, that it would be of great use to have a grasp on the notion of motivational language, and more precisely, the kinds of things that motivate and the kinds of things that do not. An understanding of this would benefit us both philosophically, by understanding morals, and professionally, in practices such as medicine, counselling or teaching.
It has been proposed for some time now, beginning with Hume, that there is a distinction between facts and values (Hume: 1739). The explanations of these two types of sentence largely cause the disparity between the sciences and ethics. The idea is that factual statements are assertions that can be true or can be false, and, evaluative statements cannot be true or false but are merely utterances, such as expressions of emotions or exclamations.
Hume gives his account of evaluations as coming from the passions and are neither true nor false - they are distinctly about emotions and do not involve reason. Hume reflects that it is these evaluations that would move us, as rationality and reason on their own are incapable of moving us at all. Though, as much of a bold statement as this is, Hume seems not to offer any real defence of this case, but rather leaving it on the note that moral evaluations are not things that are about the world. It appears, however, to have almost been an after-thought in his explanations upon morality that there is any real separation between 'is / is not' and 'ought / ought not' (which is very much the same distinction, with facts being 'is / is not' and evaluations being 'ought / ought not'), as he claims to have observed that many philosophers seem to have confused one for the other. This appears as a small paragraph whereby he explains that of reading people who speak of morality, they seem to begin with ideas of 'is', that give explanation, and end in making the claims of 'ought', that require explanation. This single paragraph has caused much influence and is truly the only place he actually suggests the idea of a clear fact / value distinction. From Hume, it is suggested as the 'is-ought problem'. This has largely influenced the basis of moral thinking for the past two-hundred and fifty years, stemming all kinds of explanations and theories.
While influential as an idea, it did not seem to be a thing of much importance to Hume, and so J. L. Mackie was one of the major philosophers who built upon this to make a clear and important distinction between facts and values (Mackie: 1977). Seeing it as a truly moral issue, Mackie asserted 'there are no moral facts' in which he seems to be clarifying the distinction further between the two proposed types of sentences, using the ideas of objectivity and subjectivity. The claim here is that all evaluative statements are subjective, and all factual statements are objective; this is because facts are about truths and falsities, and so they are not emotive, as values are. As, he claims, there are no truths in morality; all moral statements are emotive and, therefore, can motivate, while there can be no moral facts on the basis that factual statements cannot motivate.
This distinction is still an idea that remains today, even though it seems to cause philosophical problems as John Austin points out in the book 'How To Do things With Words' (A collection of lectures by Austin, formed into a book, by J. O. Urmson). Austin makes this bold claim in the opening lecture about the fact / value distinction, which he calls the 'descriptive fallacy' (The notion of when someone mistakes value utterances as statements). He suggests that many philosophers have made "the mistake of taking, as straightforward statements of fact, utterances which are either nonsensical or else something entirely different" (Austin: 1955). The claim here is to suggest that philosophers often took too much from the ideas of sentences as statements, and have not been recognising the possibility of types of sentences that are not facts and have no intention of trying to be facts. This is one issue brought about by the fact / value distinction, as the idea that a philosopher is capable of analysing any sentence as if it is a statement of fact, and so even evaluative statements seem to be sometimes considered as opinions trying to be facts, which, according to Austin, is a mistake. Rather, Austin seems to be suggesting that there is a problem with a separation between such distinctions as facts and values. This is because nobody can truly analyse utterances as straightforward statements of fact; including 'facts', as there are other things to consider, such as context, which gets largely ignored by philosophers in the analysis of language.
Reading further into Austin's lectures, however, it becomes largely apparent that he never actually addresses this issue that he seems to claim is there. Despite suggesting that the changing tide of this could be an important revolution in philosophy, at no point does he make the link clear between what he is trying to say and how it disproves ideas such as the fact / value distinction. However, this is not necessarily the fault of Austin, as upon his death he had not finished his lectures, and it could have been entirely possible that his connection was a lecture yet to come. Though, through the fate of his death, these ideas still deserve to be built upon, and not simply abandoned.
As a result, my intention here is simply to explain this link and show, quite clearly, how Austin's notions of speech acts do, in fact, play old harry (the devil) with the fact / value distinction, to the extent that it simply cannot be a plausible idea and needs to be abolished. We need to get beyond this oversimplification of moral language that has been hanging over philosophy for so long. Having already reflected upon the importance of this matter and the benefit of doing so, it should be further explained that Austin's ideas, while strong, offer no comprehensive explanation to the possible types of sentences – he merely shows language up in its complex nature. In this explanation, it is still left open for anyone else to offer an alternative notion to a language distinction that makes more sense than the fact / value, as that is not something I will be offering myself. I shall be arguing for the notion that language is much more complicated than is suggested by simplistic notions of a two, or even three or four, category distinction. Before, though, I continue on in explaining the details of Austin's work, I shall explain, upfront, and be clear on exactly how Austin's work does show up the fact / value distinction as nothing more than nonsense, and thus avoiding the similar fate in never fully explaining myself.
In pointing out the basis for the problems caused by a descriptive fallacy, Austin reflects on the idea that philosophers are an all too serious bunch who have taken the ideas of sentences too much as statements, and, as a result, have ignored the concept of context. In pointing this out, he proposes new ideas that attempt to explain not only what has been uttered, but also the intention behind what is being uttered and the possible effect that has on the receiver of the utterance. With this explanation, Austin does two things that cause major issues for the fact / value distinction. Firstly, he shows that it is entirely possible to have facts that motivate, values that do not motivate and also other possible sentence types that also can motivate or not motivate. This fades the definitions between facts and values, showing that they both seem to be the same thing. Secondly, he shows that language is more complicated than the meanings of sentences, as there are many variables in someone saying something that means it would be difficult to define any sentence as a set of categories, i.e. facts or values.

Chapter 2: Evaluative Statements

Let us, then, gain an understanding of motivational language by examining Austin's theory of the three parts that make up all speech acts: The locutionary act, the illocutionary force and the perlocutionary effect.
Firstly, the 'locutionary act' can be simply explained as 'what was said' – this is what is commonly considered and analysed in most philosophy of language, and taking these locutions prima facie is where Austin suggests many previous philosophers have made a mistake, as the locution can be an entirely ambiguous thing. The locution, such as “Don't do that!”, “Yes, please.”, “The cooker is hot.”, “That is bad.”, “Billy has left the room.” or “Help, Dorothy is dead!”, etc. are all utterances, in any form, that can or has been said. This is the simplest of the three parts of speech acts, and only takes into consideration what has actually been uttered. To follow on from this is the meaning behind the locution act, which Austin calls the 'illocutionary force'. The illocutionary force is what the person is trying to say or suggest with what they actually said. This could be to promise, advise, recommend, congratulate, declare, assert and so on to any real meaning of the locution. Furthermore, this is a largely context driven part of the speech act, as there are sentences that would require you to understand the situation in order to know what the person means by what they said. For example in the locution “there is a spider over there” could potentially mean: 'I warn you that there is a spider over there', 'I recommend you get rid of that spider over there', or 'I assert that there is a spider over there.' all dependent on the context. This is where many philosophers did not consider context, as, on paper, 'there is a spider over there' simply seems to mean 'I assert that there is a spider over there', and yet given a situation where someone who is deathly afraid of spiders says the locution, it seems that to assume they are simply making a statement of fact would be a mistake, rather they are most likely advising you to get rid of the spider.
The final part of the speech act can be broken up into two parts and is known as the 'perlocutionary effect'. This is, again, following on from the illocution and is about the effect that the locution and illocution has on the hearer. For example: 'He persuaded me to get rid of the spider.' and then 'I got rid of the spider.'. This is split into two parts, because the effect your speech has on someone and the actions brought about by that are still separate things and one does not necessarily mean the other, such as 'he persuaded me to get rid of the spider. But I did not manage get rid of the spider, because I am also deathly afraid of spiders, and wouldn't go near it'. With the perlocutionary effect we can see the motivational force of language, as the illocutionary force generates a perlocutionary effect, it shows that a single speech act in the right context seems to do things in the world around us. It is important to note, here, that this will not always be the case – as with any testimony, we do not have to accept it, and often if we do not trust or like the person we are talking to, the illocutionary force will have no effect on us. The context driven part of any perlocution is usually about who the speaker is and who the hearer is, as, whatever your intention or meaning in saying something, only certain people will accept it and give the desired effect. It is also worthy of note that the illocution and perlocution are not usually conscious things, as most people do give advice, though that advice will simply be to make an utterance; what meaning that utterance has and the hope that the effect may follow are often not consciously considered by the speaker, as much as being the subconscious intention of the speaker. As a final note, it is aptly pointed out by Austin that, within analysing language and speech acts, we are ignoring circumstances such as acting where the speech act is merely a pretence of a real speech act, and largely has no real force or effect.
So, in clarification, The speech act is broken up into three parts, the locution (What was said), the illocution (What was meant) and the perlocution (The effect). This can be demonstrated into the following example:
    A) Locution: “X is a good film.”
    B) Illocution: They recommend that I watch X.
    C1) Perlocution: I am persuaded to watch X.
    C2) I watch X.
For argument's sake, let us suggest that the perlocutions C1 and C2 are the same and the fact that I am persuaded to watch X does actually mean that I do watch X, and so forth for most perlocutionary effects. In the example, if someone were to suggest to me that, say, Fight Club is a good film, it seems reasonable that this is a recommendation of the film. In the event of being told that Fight Club is a good film, I may very well be motivated to watch the film as someone has told me the film is good. However, suppose the person carrying out the speech act has a bad judgement on films, and in the past, every film they have claimed was good has turned out to be awful! It seems, in this case, to lose the persuasive effect it had in the first case and would be more along the lines of: “Fight Club is a good film.”, 'They recommended that I watch Fight Club', 'I avoided watching Fight Club'.
Here, we can see the three parts of the speech act in practice, and that they plainly follow on from each other given the right contexts. This example is an example of what Mackie would call an evaluative statement, as there is no true or false to the locution, only an opinion intended to persuade or motivate. Through Austin's speech acts we can clearly see that not only is it an evaluative statement and has motivational force, but also how that happens. Even though the speaker may have asserted 'Fight Club is a good film' not as a recommendation nor actually intending the effect of me watching it, it still potentially has this effect. For example, suppose I approach two friends who were already in the midst of a debate as to whether Fight Club is a good film. One friend states: “Fight Club is a good film" and the other, in truly witty form, follows with "No, Fight Club is a bad film!". Neither of my friends in their locutions has any real intention of persuading me to watch the film. Though it seems likely that in hearing this, I may be taking my friend's views into account and thus am weighing up whether or not to watch the film, and they are inadvertently either persuading me to or persuading me not to watch Fight Club.
Utterances of an evaluative nature seem to be able to motivate, then, as we are simply trusting (or not trusting) the testimony of those around us, because (avoiding the aesthetics debate of objectivity in art) there seems not to be any truths or falsities in asserting a preference. So, what about a different type of evaluative example? One that is not a preference, but rather a promise:
    A) “I will stay here.”
    B) They promise that they will remain where they are.
    C1) I am persuaded they will remain where they are.
    C2) I leave in the hope of returning to them; I am comforted by their sticking with me; I trust them not to leave the stuff behind; etc.
As shown here in the perlocutionary effect, there are many contexts where “I will stay here” could be uttered, and similarly to the preference stated in the previous example, it is attempting to have the effect of persuading me. This is a different type of evaluative statement to the previous one, because it does not seem to be asserting any type of fact about the world, or preference to how good or bad something is, but merely making a promise. It is of moral consideration that promises, within reason, should be kept, and, as a result, it seems the have the effect of persuading me or not persuading me depending on who the speaker is and the context it is spoken. If, for example, I was badly hurt and could not move, one friend goes to get help and another says “I will stay here”, they are making the promise that they will stay with me, so it is up to myself or the person who is leaving to trust whether or not they will do as they promise. In this case, it seems most likely that they will keep the promise. However, if, in the example, I am at the pub with a group of friends whom all want to leave to get a drink, the least trusted member of the group states “I will stay here” it may have the effect of my not trusting him to look after our stuff, so this may have the effect of me staying with him, so that he is not left alone.
Though considered as an evaluative statement, this example locution of “I will stay here” is also making an assertion that does blur the line slightly between facts and values, as it seems it is possible for there to be a truth or false factor to it. If someone makes the promise that they intend to stay where they are, and they do, is it not true that they have stayed where they were, and, in fact, was true when they stated 'I will stay here'? Though it can be argued that it is still a subjective notion as there are other factors that might make it impossible for them to keep their promise, so, for now, we shall accept that this fits under Mackie's definition of a motivating evaluative sentence.
So, both of these examples show the use of evaluative statements, and that they can be used in vastly different ways to different effects according to the context. As they are both different, however, we can show that pretty much any evaluative statement can have this motivational force as the illocution seems to always follow what was said. Even if the evaluative sentence was not about persuading, but rather to advise, or congratulate, or other such illocutions, it seems all of these would have some form of motivational force. Austin makes this clarification in the circumstance of the utterance as an important factor as we may say things such as “Coming from her, I am not sure she was sincere” or, to use Austin's example, “Coming from him, I took it as an order, not as a request". Evaluative statements largely come from whether or not we trust a person's testimony, and that, in turn, is dependant on the circumstance or the context of the testimony.
Austin's use of the speech act, here, demonstrated by these values, do not directly go against the fact / value distinction as we have only shown the motivational force of values, which is what Mackie suggests, though, rather than showing just that they do motivate, we have shown how they motivate and also that they may not motivate at all. With the clarification of the illocution, we can suggest that there are many ways in which a value may motivate, be it to persuade or declare or otherwise, and even these different kinds exhibit different effects in different contexts – often showing that there is no effect, as the context given did not motivate the hearer at all. So it already seems a push to simplify this as a single category by claiming 'all values motivate' as, often, they do not motivate. Rather it is much apter to claim that 'values have the potential to motivate' which is a broad notion that accepts language to be so complicated. Next, then, with this in mind, we shall examine factual statements.

Chapter 3: Factual Statements

Facts, to Mackie and Hume, are things about the world. They are things of reason, and factual statements can either be true or false. In this regard it is thought that statements of fact can never motivate; facts are objective assertions and have no bearing on how you 'ought' or 'ought not' act. This would set them apart from evaluative sentences, and, in the same way I have shown situations to suggest evaluations have the potential to not motivate, I will show, using the same method, that factual statements do have the potential to motivate. Let us, then, take an example of a factual sentence and see how it works under the notion of a speech act.
“That knife is very sharp” is a factual sentence as, prima facie, all that is being asserted is a property of the knife, as a thing about the world. Naturally, the degree of sharpness will mean different things to different people, so let us assume that 'very sharp' means 'sharp enough to easily cut you', then we may suggest the following context for the speech act:
    A) “That knife is very sharp.”
    B) They advise that I not touch that knife.
    C1) I am persuaded that the knife could be dangerous.
    C2) I avoid the knife.
With this example, it seems that the apparent assertion of a fact is actually a word of advice, rather than a mere statement. More importantly, this is a fact that, given context, seems to be able to motivate. Not only is the factual sentence being said with the intention to motivate through the illocution (B), but also through the perlocution (C) is it more than likely that I have been motivated to act in some way. Now if the situation is changed, perhaps it can motivate in other ways. It may be that, in a very morbid sense, I am suicidal and while I am with someone they say “That knife is very sharp”, fully with the same intention as in the first situation. This may motivate me in a way separate to the intention of the speaker (to avoid the knife), and motivate me to use that knife on myself. The perlocution in this example is completely irrespective of the illocution, in that they have not motivated me in the way they expected, but I have still been motivated by the mere utterance of the locution (A).
It is worthy of note, that much like in the evaluation example, this is not always going to have a motivational effect. In that if someone asserts “That knife is very sharp” in an attempt to make me avoid the knife, I may either not believe them, or simply ignore them and go on to touch the knife anyway, perhaps cutting myself, or merely not touch the knife regardless of what was said, as I was never going to anyway.
This example, then, seems very similar to evaluative examples in the potential it has to motivate, as facts are not supposed to be able to do, as well as not motivate – and this largely depends on the context. In fact, if we look at the previous example of the argument in a pub about a film being good, perhaps we can extend this here and say that a chef and a weapons expert were to argue, each with their own standard of sharpness. The chef may assert “that knife is very sharp” and the weapons expert may state the opposite: “That knife is not very sharp”, while it is a thin line to argue semantics, it is still possible that different standards could be considered. This would perhaps have some type of motivation to me; if either one of these people makes the claim “that knife is very sharp”, I, with little knowledge or experience with knives outside of my own kitchen, may be persuaded to believe the knife is sharp regardless of the other's opinion that it is not, as it is probably sharp enough for me.
The point here is simply to suggest that there are different standards involved with notions as 'sharpness', and as a result it may be suggested that this example is a poor excuse for a factual sentence. While they would be wrong about this – because it is a factual sentence under the standards I am arguing against – let us give this opinion the benefit of the doubt and take another example.
    A) “Billy has left the room”
    B) They warn me that Billy has left the room.
    C1) I am aware that Billy has left the room.
    C2) I run after Billy.
As a sentence, it is making an assertion about the world to say “X has left the room” and can either be true of false. The statement of fact is that X has actually left the room; there is no standard to which X may not have left the room. Thus, this is a fact with no notion of standard being involved. Here, then, the situation may be that I am trying to keep an eye on Billy whilst talking to someone else; after I am warned that Billy has left the room, I may be worried that he will get into trouble and so I am motivated to retrieve or follow Billy. So even in this fact example there seems a possibility to motivate. Though, can the situation change, and it still motivate?
    A) “Billy has left the room.”
    B) They advise me to start talking about Billy.
    C1) I am made aware that I can talk about Billy.
    C2) I start talking about Billy.
Now, while I may not particularly be a nice person for specifically talking about Billy behind his back, in this example it could be that I wish to share information about Billy, but am being careful to do so. Upon being told “Billy has left the room” I am being advised that it is now okay to begin saying what I wished to say about Billy. This type of sentence can be used in different situations and the illocution comes through in these contexts, often if the locution would be ambiguous in a situation it is the way in which the locution is spoken that might give us the basis of the meaning behind the locution. To clarify this, it may be a certain emphasis on a word that could change the meaning. If, for example, I was talking about general things and someone warned me that “Billy has left the room” it could be that I want to say something about Billy, or to go after him. However, if I was talking and someone said “Billy has left the room”, the emphasis on the name particularly might be a suggestion that I have offended Billy to make him leave, and so I feel guilty and am persuaded to apologise. Or perhaps that I am warned that Billy has left the room when I am complaining about someone doing something, and so am to assume that he is guilty.
The information here should not be anything new to anyone. The ideas about the way in which something is being said changing the meaning behind what is being said is a skill we naturally pick up through language from a very young age. When a parent says something sternly as to be annoyed or disappointed, the child learns that they should amend what they've done, or simply not do it again, despite that not being what was actually necessarily said. Though, this does give an idea to how deep context goes, and, as a result, it seems all kinds of sentences have the potential to motivate. The way things are said seem to have a bearing into the effect they have on the listener, and, as a result, it does not seem factual statements are exempt from this.
How about, then, a more general fact? One that seems to simply be an assertion about the world, that has little bearing to situations, and, therefore, would seem not to be able to motivate. Consider the utterance “Diamonds are made out of carbon.” It would seem that this is simply a statement of fact, and would scarcely be said outside of the situation of teaching, or information giving. Perhaps teaching is a speech act in itself that can be considered:
    A) “Diamonds are made out of carbon.”
    B) They urged me to understand what diamonds are made from.
    C1) I learned (remembered) that diamonds are made from carbon.
    C2) I repeated this information to others; I was inspired to learn more about geology; I turned my grandfather's ashes into a diamond ring.
So with this speech act, it seems that the illocution was not actually an intentional motivation to action, but merely an urging to learn. How I was motivated to act, however, could change due to my circumstance, as with all the other examples. It could be that this fact may have been something that the speaker knew I would find fascinating, and, therefore, intended to impress me with the information, and simply as something for me to know. The perlocution, however, was that I was so interested that I went to find out more about diamonds, or geology in general, to find out what things are made from. It seems to be a safe assumption about teaching that all givers of information are urging you to remember or understand that information. In an education situation, it could be suggested that they are advising you to remember the information so that you may produce it in an exam. All of these can also be illocutions for other general facts about the world when used to pass on information, so with effect of teaching facts, there still seems to be motivations inherently linked to speech acts. Even so, it seems we could find a specific situation where the fact may be used, in most cases, with the intention of motivation. Given that I have been told by a friend that diamonds are made out of carbon when talking about my grandfather having died, and I did not know what to do with the ashes. The illocutionary force may well be, in this case, to persuade me to turn those ashes into a diamond ring, and the perlocutionary effect could be that I do carry this out.
With all three of these examples showing the different sides to facts, it seems that all facts have the potential to motivate in many similar ways to evaluations, while it is true that both of these also can potentially not motivate. It does seem, however, that not only is it becoming unclear as to what the difference is between factual statements and evaluative statements, but language seems to hold much importance to the way we speak, to whom we are speaking, and how we say what we have said. It seems that of all locutions, there is potentially a motivational force and a motivated effect. As a result, Mackie must have been wrong in his assertion that 'there are no moral facts' – because if facts can motivate just as much as evaluations, then it is through the illocution of all assertions that we may have the intention of suggesting 'you ought or ought not do this'.
The fact / value distinction, at this point, is weak, if at all still holding on to existence. So what can we do to break this down further? Well, let us look at this notion that we can suggest 'ought' through 'is' – or rather moral evaluations through factual statements – this weakens the notions of objectivity and subjectivity, which is what Mackie seems to be basing his distinction on. Perhaps, though, we suggest that that there are still factual statements, and they are objective, thought we may say that it is only through the intention behind the locution that makes a factual statement seem like an evaluative statement. We could also suggest that it is the people involved in evaluative statements that make them not motivating, but they are still emotive and subjective. Well then, in order to avoid this line of thought, in the next section, I shall argue against alternative lines of argument that blend the fact / value distinction, and show how they are no different to what we have found so far.

Chapter 4: Changing the distinction

Much of the ideas of a fact / value distinction relies on the ideas of values being morally motivating, and seeing as values are said to be subjective, the suggestion of Mackie seems to be that there are no truths in morality. While, in many moral acts, this does seem to work, such as lying, violence, murder, kindness, generosity, speeding, trespassing and so on, which all have situations that change whether they are acceptable or not, so not set in absolutes, is it correct to suggest there are no objective morals?
Philippa Foot suggests, of Mackie's notion of facts and values, that perhaps there is a third type of sentence which, in a sense, breaks the distinction – and that is a blending of both facts and values. That is to say that Foot claims there are statements that are still facts, but also motivating (Foot, 1958). She does this by explaining the notion of 'rudeness is bad', and that to use the word is different to actually meaning the word, as even though rudeness is different to many people, we are still all using the same criteria for what 'rudeness' actually is. If, then, someone can think 'I am acting rudely' when they know the situation does not actually satisfy the condition for 'rudeness', they are wrong about this. So, it seems that with 'rudeness' there is a right and a wrong. Foot suggests this must be 'a non-evaluative premise from which an evaluative conclusion can be deduced' vis-á-vis a fact that motivates.
Foot's suggestion that morals motivate and her criteria for the notion that some morals are objective does seem to make sense, however, she still seems to be using this fact / value distinction and adhering to it's rules, even if she is simply creating a third category. So with this in mind, we might be able to use Austin's notion of a speech act to examine this possibility that an evaluative-fact exists. If it were that there was simply this third category, perhaps, then, there are facts and values but also a mix of the two and the distinction can still be used to explain utterance types but on a much looser basis than the clear distinction. For this, then, we will need to examine utterances that are clearly objective facts that are still capable of motivating. Foot's example of 'rudeness is bad', however, seems to be a problematic example as I could easily suggest that it would not exactly be a bad thing to be rude to people who do not deserve your respect (tyrannical dictators for example). It is accepted, though, by many philosophers, that the idea of 'cruelty' is an objectively bad thing, such as rape or torturing someone for fun. 'Cruelty' being defined as any act that intentionally causes unnecessary harm, seems to always be bad. This is because we consider pain to be generally bad, so unnecesscary pain is always bad, and 'cruelty' specifies that the act is both intentional and that the victim does not deserve the harm coming to them. So with this we can say:
    A) “Cruelty is bad.”
    B) They urge me not to be cruel.
    C1) I am persuaded that cruelty is bad.
    C2) I avoid being cruel.
Now, seeing as cruelty is objectively bad, to say “Cruelty is bad”, is a fact, because it is an assertion that fits with either being true of false (as it would be false for anyone to suggest that cruelty is good), and yet it has an 'evaluative' conclusion. In this example, if someone accepts that cruelty is bad, and then is making a cheese sandwich and thinks 'this is cruel and therefore bad' they would be making a mistake, as in order for something to be cruel it has the fit the criteria for 'being cruel'. Also, if someone were to be stabbing innocent people on the street and thinks 'this is cruel and therefore good', they are also making a mistake because cruelty cannot be good. So there would be specific criteria by which something being cruel (and therefore bad) would fit and by uttering “cruelty is bad” you are almost always urging people not to act in such a way that could be defined as cruel. If the speaker is someone to be trusted, then, the perlocutionary effect of uttering the locution is that people learn not to be cruel.
Though, despite cruelty being bad and by asserting 'Cruelty is bad.' you are urging the listener not to be cruel, could it also not motivate? If an evil person decided to bring up a child and told it that 'cruelty is good', that the speaker is likely to be trusted would be urging the child to be cruel, and the effect is likely that the child will be cruel to things if they do not learn otherwise. So, then, if someone were to incorrectly believe that cruelty is good and someone they do not trust at all asserts that 'cruelty is bad', they seem unlikely to just accept the notion as they are likely to think they are making a mistake about this. The context of the 'speech act' puts this idea of a potentially motivating fact as no different to regular facts, and also regular evaluations. So the idea here is that all of these statements seem to be the same type of sentence – one that dependent on the context can potentially motivate, but also potentially not motivate. With this, we can suggest that while Foot was trying to disregard Mackie's idea of there being no moral facts, she still used notions of facts and values to attempt to do so, and so it would be better if we did not have this distinction at all.
Here, though, all I have shown is that there are criterion for objective moral acts and that, via the speech act, they seem not to be any different to any other type of fact or value. So let us attempt to disregard any notion of the fact / value distinction left with some examples of much more complicated utterances so show that potentially all language seems to fit under similar a criteria as the examples I have already used.
    A) I said to myself:  “Congratulating Barry is the right thing to do.”
    B) I committed myself to congratulating Barry.
    C1) I persuaded myself to congratulate Barry; I could not commit to congratulating Barry.
    C2) I congratulate Barry; I do not congratulate Barry.
In this example, if Barry had done nothing particularly wrong and had just got married, for example, to congratulate him would be the kind thing to do, seeing as kindness has certain criteria. So by my own standards, congratulating Barry is actually the right thing to do, because to me, being kind is a good thing. So I decide to commit myself to doing this act and, when I next see Barry, I congratulate him. This, as a speech act to one's self, sits in the same motivations as speech acts from other people, because it is still a motivating thing. Perhaps, if I had not reminded myself or committed to it, I may have forgotten and not carried out the action. Though, perhaps I simply have a strong dislike for Barry, but for no particular reason. I still may be able to objectively suggest to myself “congratulating Barry is the right thing to do” and commit to doing this, though when it actually came to meeting Barry, my distaste towards him means I could not bring myself to congratulate him, despite it being the right thing to do.
This is much more complicated for a few reasons, firstly, to congratulate someone is an illocution in itself, so it may be that in congratulating someone you do not say the words 'congratulations', but rather something else that they accept as a congratulation. Secondly, it is being said to yourself, so it might not necessarily have been said out loud, but the locution still stands as part of the speech act as the idea of it still follows with an illocution and a perlocution. Thirdly, even though kindness is not necessarily an objective notion, people still have some of their own moral standards, so to say 'X is the right thing to do' to yourself may still be a fact, as you genuinely believe that G is always good, and X fits the criteria of G. Despite this being very different to all the previous examples and fits under the category of a 'factual-evaluation' by Mackie and Foot's definitions – it seems to be no different to the others, it can potentially motivate and also not motivate depending largely on the context.
As a last example then:
    A) My teacher told me that my argument was both valid and sound but irrelevant to the topic I was discussing.
    B) My teacher both condemned and criticised my argument.
    C1) I was persuaded that my argument was a good argument but also that there were problems with my argument with regards to relevancy.
    C2) I decided to change my argument to make it more relevant to the topic; I kept my argument how it was but tried to persuade my teacher that it is relevant to the topic.
This example is one that is still someone talking to themselves, but paraphrasing someone else, it does also seem that an argument being valid and sound seems to be factual, and an argument being irrelevant seems factual, but considering this is an idea coming from a teacher the intention is to be motivated to change their argument so that it either is relevant or to explain why it is relevant, etc.
This example, again, is both factual and evaluative, and the idea remains the same. For someone to use a locution based on something their teacher told them, it is simply stating a fact, but also the reason this is being considered is because I am trying to find a way to change my work. So the locution is very much motivating, even though the example is based on 'facts' (it is a fact my teacher said this and it's a fact that something is valid and sound and it is a fact that something is irrelevant), and in this example the motivation comes from the way in which I will change my work. If, however, I disliked the teacher or simply thought my teacher was wrong it would stand to reason that I would (albeit arrogantly) refuse to change my irrelevant argument.
Even when trying to break the fact value distinction by merging them together or try to find utterances that change what the distinction is, it seems that all utterances do seem to fall under the same type of sentence which is not one of facts or values or even both, but something entirely different.

Chapter 5: There is no distinction

Using John Austin's speech acts, I have shown that even the locutions that seem as if they do not have an illocutionary force and a perlocutionary effect, in fact, do have both of these. This is because given the context of an utterance, there will always be a meaning behind what was being said, and that meaning will either motivate the hearer or not motivate the hearer. As a result, all speech has the potential to motivate. When language is viewed in this way, it does not seem plausible to make a distinction between sentence types based on them being objective, subjective, motivating or not motivating as all sentences are just sentences and not certain kinds of sentences. So, Mackie must have been wrong when he claimed that there are no moral facts, and Austin does show the fact / value distinction to be nothing more than nonsense. Furthermore, a fundamentally important aspect that Austin's speech acts shows us is that language is far more complicated than Mackie and Hume have previously suggested, and this is certainly something worthy of note.
Understanding this will be important for moral philosophy as, as Austin pointed out, many philosophers have made mistakes due to accepting the fact / value distinction. To use context allows us to understand moral language more accurately, and in future theories we would not have to be restricted by the ideas of facts and evaluations as philosophers have done for the past two-hundred and fifty years. While people such as Philippa Foot tried to show problems with the fact / value distinction, none have displayed a method such as Austin to completely abolish it. As a result of Austin, it seems that we may begin accepting his notion of speech acts and form new moral theories under his influence rather than relying on the things suggested by Hume.
With regards to the use of speech acts in everyday language, it seems important to understand that the things we say have an effect on other people, and when we consider that everything we say can potentially move them in certain kinds of ways, it seems that things like advice giving likely have a more profound effect than we realise. These notions of motivations suggest that in everyday life we may be able to make basic observations and not ignore them simply as assertions, but rather as understanding the meanings behind them. For example, if someone was to make the observation 'you're wearing green' to someone else, it is possible they meant it as a compliment or an insult or something else entirely based on the context of the situation and the way they said it. Perhaps, if said on St Patrick's day, it would be an acknowledgement that they are celebrating the day. Alternatively, the idea could be that they made the observation with the advice of them wearing green more often, or less often, etc. To assume they were simply making a statement, with knowledge of illocutions, seems to be a bizarre notion. When we know that simple assertions and facts can actually mean things in everyday language, more than the utterance itself, we may even have the effect of understanding people better, or having the influence we desire to have on other people, or even ourselves.
When we make locutions, it is possible to analyse potential illocutions to figure out what it is we actually are trying to say, as oppose to just analysing the utterance itself. In practices such as teaching or counselling the giving of advice is a core part, so it may be beneficial for us to understand what advice we may take when someone utters a fact, how we might use the information we are being given, or even for the speaker to say the right things to have the right effect. With the use of speech acts, we can have a clearer basis that not all of our opinions are going to move others and that not all facts are simple assertions, but rather all of the things we say can potentially motivate others into acting in certain ways.
John Austin does seem to play the devil with Mackie and Hume's fact / value distinction, and the abolition of this makes a change that Austin suggests could be one of the biggest revolutions in modern philosophy. As a result of Austin we know that language is much more complicated than most people have suggested thus far. By being able to understand language better, without basing our ideas on false theories, we may write about philosophy and understand philosophy more accurately, so it does not seem to be too much of an overestimation to say that this is a big deal. With motivations being so core to the ways in which we act, then, the use of speech acts can more accurately make sense of our motivations than any other method. So, with the lack of a fact / value distinction it may be possible for someone, perhaps a logician, to place a more accurate theory instead, and if so, they would need to build it around the idea of speech acts.



References:
・     Austin, J. L, (1962). How To Do Things With Words. Clarendon Press: Oxford.
・     Foot, P, (1958). Moral Arguments. Mind. 268 (4), pp.502 – 514
・    Gingell, J; Winch, C, (2008). Philosophy of education. The Key Concepts. 2nd Ed. Routledge: Oxford.
・    Hume, D, (1739) A Treatise Of Human Nature (1896 ed.) Clarendon Press: Oxford.
・    Mackie, J. L. (1977). Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Penguin: London.

・    Searle, J. R. (1975), “A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts”, in: Günderson, K. (ed.), Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 7, University of Minneapolis Press, p. 344-69.