Dissertation Sample

Does John Austin Play Old Harry With The Fact / Value Distinction?
An investigation into the moral motivations of language.

Kyle Michael Sweet
April 2014

I, Kyle Michael Sweet, declare that all work found within this paper is composed by myself, and that the presented work is that of my own.
All work which is not entirely my own has been referenced in accordance with the system demanded by the university of Northampton.


Date: 23 / 04 / 2014
------------------------------------------------------------------


Does John Austin Play Old Harry With The Fact / Value Distinction?
An investigation into the moral motivations of language.


Chapter 1: Motivations and John Austin
It is not only worthy of note, but rather a necessity in understanding human actions, that our motivations are at the core of everything we do. With regard to this, it is completely within reason for testimony to be the greatest motivational force, for we wholeheartedly rely on the testimony of those we trust by means of advice, education and welfare in our everyday lives. The giving and taking of advice plays a fundamental place in such everyday things (i.e. friendships, professional practices, parenting, and so on), that nobody seems to be exempt from the influence of others. Predominantly, it seems to be the intention of giving advice that the person takes that advice and, therefore, carry out the advice given (Winch; Gingell: 2008). Even those in such a remote setting as a solitary hunter-gatherer tribe would learn by means of others when to stop running after a creature or which berries not to eat, despite nearly having caught the creature, or being very hungry, if it were not to benefit them. I believe it to be implausible for anyone from any walk of life to survive very long, or at least lead a healthy life, by purely relying on base desires and uninfluenced reason alone as their motivations.

It would seem, then, that it would be of great use to have a grasp on the notion of motivational language, and more precisely, the kinds of things that motivate and the kinds of things that do not. An understanding of this would benefit us both philosophically, by understanding morals, and professionally, in practices such as medicine, counselling or teaching.
It has been proposed for some time now, beginning with Hume, that there is a distinction between facts and values (Hume: 1739). The explanations of these two types of sentence largely cause the disparity between the sciences and ethics. The idea is that factual statements are assertions that can be true or can be false, and, evaluative statements cannot be true or false but are merely utterances, such as expressions of emotions or exclamations.

Hume gives his account of evaluations as coming from the passions and are neither true nor false - they are distinctly about emotions and do not involve reason. Hume reflects that it is these evaluations that would move us, as rationality and reason on their own are incapable of moving us at all. Though, as much of a bold statement as this is, Hume seems not to offer any real defence of this case, but rather leaving it on the note that moral evaluations are not things that are about the world. It appears, however, to have almost been an after-thought in his explanations upon morality that there is any real separation between 'is / is not' and 'ought / ought not' (which is very much the same distinction, with facts being 'is / is not' and evaluations being 'ought / ought not'), as he claims to have observed that many philosophers seem to have confused one for the other. This appears as a small paragraph whereby he explains that of reading people who speak of morality, they seem to begin with ideas of 'is', that give explanation, and end in making the claims of 'ought', that require explanation. This single paragraph has caused much influence and is truly the only place he actually suggests the idea of a clear fact / value distinction. From Hume, it is suggested as the 'is-ought problem'. This has largely influenced the basis of moral thinking for the past two-hundred and fifty years, stemming all kinds of explanations and theories.

While influential as an idea, it did not seem to be a thing of much importance to Hume, and so J. L. Mackie was one of the major philosophers who built upon this to make a clear and important distinction between facts and values (Mackie: 1977). Seeing it as a truly moral issue, Mackie asserted 'there are no moral facts' in which he seems to be clarifying the distinction further between the two proposed types of sentences, using the ideas of objectivity and subjectivity. The claim here is that all evaluative statements are subjective, and all factual statements are objective; this is because facts are about truths and falsities, and so they are not emotive, as values are. As, he claims, there are no truths in morality; all moral statements are emotive and, therefore, can motivate, while there can be no moral facts on the basis that factual statements cannot motivate.

This distinction is still an idea that remains today, even though it seems to cause philosophical problems as John Austin points out in the book 'How To Do things With Words' (A collection of lectures by Austin, formed into a book, by J. O. Urmson). Austin makes this bold claim in the opening lecture about the fact / value distinction, which he calls the 'descriptive fallacy' (The notion of when someone mistakes value utterances as statements). He suggests that many philosophers have made "the mistake of taking, as straightforward statements of fact, utterances which are either nonsensical or else something entirely different" (Austin: 1955). The claim here is to suggest that philosophers often took too much from the ideas of sentences as statements, and have not been recognising the possibility of types of sentences that are not facts and have no intention of trying to be facts. This is one issue brought about by the fact / value distinction, as the idea that a philosopher is capable of analysing any sentence as if it is a statement of fact, and so even evaluative statements seem to be sometimes considered as opinions trying to be facts, which, according to Austin, is a mistake. Rather, Austin seems to be suggesting that there is a problem with a separation between such distinctions as facts and values. This is because nobody can truly analyse utterances as straightforward statements of fact; including 'facts', as there are other things to consider, such as context, which gets largely ignored by philosophers in the analysis of language.

Reading further into Austin's lectures, however, it becomes largely apparent that he never actually addresses this issue that he seems to claim is there. Despite suggesting that the changing tide of this could be an important revolution in philosophy, at no point does he make the link clear between what he is trying to say and how it disproves ideas such as the fact / value distinction. However, this is not necessarily the fault of Austin, as upon his death he had not finished his lectures, and it could have been entirely possible that his connection was a lecture yet to come. Though, through the fate of his death, these ideas still deserve to be built upon, and not simply abandoned.

As a result, my intention here is simply to explain this link and show, quite clearly, how Austin's notions of speech acts do, in fact, play old harry (the devil) with the fact / value distinction, to the extent that it simply cannot be a plausible idea and needs to be abolished. We need to get beyond this oversimplification of moral language that has been hanging over philosophy for so long. Having already reflected upon the importance of this matter and the benefit of doing so, it should be further explained that Austin's ideas, while strong, offer no comprehensive explanation to the possible types of sentences – he merely shows language up in its complex nature. In this explanation, it is still left open for anyone else to offer an alternative notion to a language distinction that makes more sense than the fact / value, as that is not something I will be offering myself. I shall be arguing for the notion that language is much more complicated than is suggested by simplistic notions of a two, or even three or four, category distinction. Before, though, I continue on in explaining the details of Austin's work, I shall explain, upfront, and be clear on exactly how Austin's work does show up the fact / value distinction as nothing more than nonsense, and thus avoiding the similar fate in never fully explaining myself.

In pointing out the basis for the problems caused by a descriptive fallacy, Austin reflects on the idea that philosophers are an all too serious bunch who have taken the ideas of sentences too much as statements, and, as a result, have ignored the concept of context. In pointing this out, he proposes new ideas that attempt to explain not only what has been uttered, but also the intention behind what is being uttered and the possible effect that has on the receiver of the utterance. With this explanation, Austin does two things that cause major issues for the fact / value distinction. Firstly, he shows that it is entirely possible to have facts that motivate, values that do not motivate and also other possible sentence types that also can motivate or not motivate. This fades the definitions between facts and values, showing that they both seem to be the same thing. Secondly, he shows that language is more complicated than the meanings of sentences, as there are many variables in someone saying something that means it would be difficult to define any sentence as a set of categories, i.e. facts or values.

Transsistor - Red's Place in Cloudbank

 Spoiler Warning: This video will be heavily spoiling the back story to a fantastic game which is much better played without knowing anything about it. So if you have not yet played the game Transistor, then I implore you to turn back now and do so. The content of this video is for people who have either played the game or have no intention of ever doing so.

Transistor, more than most games, has a heavy emphasis on the soundtrack and how the music plays into the game and the story. This seems to be a theme among Supergiant Game's creative style and the soundtrack is a much discussed part of the game, so their efforts in creating not only a video game, but a long-standing piece or art, is evident. In Transistor specifically, Red - our main protagonist, has had her voice stolen from the very beginning, leaving us, the player, to work out who Red is as a person by ourselves. Red, as a character, however, is far from silent, as rather than telling her story via dialogue, she tells us through the game's soundtrack.

Red is a musician, and a very popular one at that, and the lyrical music in the soundtrack of the game is thought to be Red's music. The reason for this is that specific songs play in sections where the lyrics become relevant, and the lyrical content of the songs speaks volumes about one female's feelings on Cloudbank. Further than this is the player's ability to add to the non-vocal songs during the game by holding a button that let's Red stop and hum to the music. Red humming to the songs shows she knows the music, and the voice of the hum and voice of the lyrics to the songs are both performed by the talented Ashley Barrett. This is telling to the player, because in the calmer parts of the game it shows a mix of Red's missing her voice and love of singing, that she uses it as reflection time even when the world is literally falling down around her. We have the option in this to actively stop what we're doing and just listen to her hum, an emphasis on music that holds an underlying narrative to the story of Transistor.

In order to understand Red, however, we need to understand the situation she is in, and to do that, we need to have a closer look at the city of Cloudbank. Cloudbank is in a permanent state of flux, with their democracy having progressed to a state that passers by on the street can use polling stations to vote on the daily, weekly, monthly issues. Anything can rise and fall by popular demand, and with this freedom and idyllic society, nobody is happy. The lack of happiness is an important part of why Red is such a popular figure. With everyone being logged on these machines and all of their decisions remembered, the entire city is part of a grid and your decisions will forever be known. This can be seen with people's statistics inside the Transistor, being carried by Red the entire game, into which people can be absorbed and their data used – the Transistor, being both a key and a weapon and our catalyst to the events of the game, is capable of regurgitating all of the data that is being held on people, such as the 8% of people wearing the clothes of Maximilas Darzi, or who voted on what colour Farra Yon-Dale should next paint the sky. There is no hiding.

Red as one hates the fact that she is logged, and more so than others. As a famous singer she keeps herself very privately, never truly wanting to reveal much about herself and states many of her reasons for doing the things she does as 'personal ones'. As part of her secret life, though is one man in particular who Red is drawn to for being the way he is. The unknown voice in the Transistor acts as our narrator through the game and seems not to know as little as the player does, because, like the player, he is also not a part of Cloudbank. The unknown man lives off the grid, never votes in polls or gets logged, he keeps himself as secret as possible, which is both why the Transistor has no data on him and why Red is drawn to him, because in essence, he doesn't exist. He is not part of the system. One of her songs, 'Paper Boats', seems to be about her relationship with the unknown man. In the first verse and chorus of the song has accompanying vocals by this character, which heavily suggests who the song is about. The song references how different they are in the world, with Red being such a widely seen public figure, and the unnamed man being unseen, and yet they have an almost magnetic attraction to each other. This is told in the lines such as 'The river always finds the sea.' or 'The earth and the moon' with one being big and still needing the smaller. This song, being such a personal one to her, also lets us in on her utmost desire – simply to move to the country, a fact which is also referenced in another song, which emphasises her desire not to be part of Cloutbank's system.

Red's music however, is not only personal to her, but some of her more general songs speaks to the Cloudbank public on a certain level. As their unhappiness stems, not only from the fact that their logged, but also their pressure to conform. With the almost idyllic democratic state of Cloudbank being in a state that seems to be so free and open to everyone's ideas, they are are suffocated by their own freedom. To speak out against democracy or public opinion puts you in a controversial category, so while some choice are base preference, there are other that are decided for you by public speakers, to speak against them will forever be remembered, so the majority pressures are high. This leads to people acting in what 20th century philosopher Sartre calls 'bad faith'. Any time someone feels they should do something, or acting a way they feel they have to, is acting in bad faith. Bad faith, he claims is usually a product of a society shaping the ways people ideally should live their lives regardless of their preference, an example of this would be making girls wear pink, and boys blue – an arbitrary choice that many people live with in their thoughts because they are simply told it's what those colours represent. In many cases bad faith is harmful to the individual, especially so when, like In Cloudbank, people often must be knowingly acting in bad faith with little to do about it.

One of Red's songs 'Signals', tells this story about the society in general and suggests that Red is aware there are others like her who desire not to be a part of the system. The song emphasises her desire to break out of the system at any cost, with lines such as 'Take up the call and follow everybody, I won't be a number in the system', and perhaps more obviously 'We're all sending smoke signals, keep pretending we're one.' - with 'one' suggesting the way society acts in general with everyone following the crowd, but Red being aware that everyone are sending signals to each other that everything is not okay. With lyrics such as these, it is easy to see why some may have found her music to be provocative in the game, and why she plays such an important role in Claoudbank. Another song, 'We All Become' focuses much more on the idea of everyone becoming one whole unit, and her defiance against that. The lyric that most emphasises this feeling is where she says 'Think I'll go where it suits me, moving out to the country, With everyone, before we all become one.' This mention of the country twice strikes, to me, another philosophical idea in Locke's soft-determinism. Simply put, we are all on a set path of restriction, even though we seem like we have free will. So, even if someone wanted to leave Cloudbank, they would likely be prevented from doing so one way or another. This idea is a harmful thought and perhaps one that is reminiscent of what it is like to live inside Cloudbank.


While Red never intended to be controversial with her music, it did cause a stir, and she became incredibly popular; a suggestion that there are many people who her music speaks to, so even though they don't say it out loud, they are also unhappy with the way Cloudbank is. Red's place in Cloudbank, then, is not as a catalyst, but as an outlet to many people's inner thoughts, including her own. Yet, while she is aware of the reach of her music, Red remained mysterious, not willing to be a part of the hype and conflict. As The Transistor tells us, after an unspecified 'altercation' at one of her events she receded from the limelight in order to write new material, which we may infer to be the songs that appear in the game. Overall, Red's position in Cloudbank is both fortunate and unfortunate. She happened to be around at the time where collapse was imminent between the arrival of the Camerata and the cracks beginning to show in the public. Between her bold behaviour in writing controversial music and personal desire to stay mysterious and keep to herself, Red's entire story ended up being the beginning to the end of Cloudbank.
An Open Letter To Many Men.

   Dear many men,
   You’re going to have to genuinely believe me when I say that it is almost always significantly more rewarding to be in a woman’s company and not her vagina. If a person of the opposite gender talks to you, smiles at you, laughs at your jokes - it is absolutely fine to accept this as a pleasant human interaction and not a presented opportunity.

   By not learning from people, but rather seeing them only as a chance at temporary base pleasure, you’re engaging in a self-fulfilling prophecy that is hindering and toxic to everyone. If this is so, you will never fully understand that interacting with women in a way that is comfortable, without an intention, is actually awesome and you gain a lot more from that thing.

   Furthermore, if someone isn’t smiling, that is not your business, you have no understanding of their current situation and it is wise to give them space. Also, when someone is wearing something, anything, this is their choice and that is fine. Do not comment unless you are in a situation which deems it appropriate, such as occupying the same interest group, or having briefly met them before, but then be on your merry way - compliments are only compliments without personal gain or intention.

   Whether a person of the opposite gender declines your approach or requests something of you, such as to leave them alone, indulge them. It is only polite and to not heed this warning causes dismay for everyone involved. Them having a boyfriend or an alternative sexual orientation to you is not a part of the current situation, so do not enquire - a reason for the word ‘no’ should never be necessary.

   When you have achieved all of this, do not fret; there are still specific places you can go for casual encounters that involves mutual interest. There will be many opportunities for honest relationships to happen organically (without expectation), as these are also things that many women will want, too, in a less creepy and demoralised way (See: human).

   Congratulations, perhaps in these circumstances you will now achieve a larger amount compatibility, comfortability and most importantly, respect in all aspects of your life. And remember: you are entitled to nothing, respect is earned, and power gives neither of these things.

   Yours sincerely,
   A Man, a person, a friend.

   P.S. Women aren’t exempt from similar negative behaviour, the point of equality is that we should all not be toxic together. Yay!

Capsule

     The site, half-surrounded by metal woven fences, was exactly as it used to be, except for the abundance of 'Do Not Enter' tape covering the gaps. Sign posts with danger warnings had also been erected, which was startling to the three trespassers. It was Amy who voiced her concern first.
     “I don't remember all this bein' here, guys.” She twanged the caution tape. “Since when did this happen?”
     “What gives you the idea I have any faintest clue, Aims?” He shone his torch in her face, making her recoil from the light. “I told you, I've not been here for at least three years, even then I was only passing by!”
     “Chill it out! I mean if you heard any news or whatever - get off the defensive.” She laughed, and Joe gave her a bat on the arm with his torch.
     “Don't take the piss, this is just all a bit strange to me too. It's been here for years, I have no idea why they'd tape it up, now. Maybe just a council thing, a complaint from an old dude.”
     “Really, Joe, just calm down, why you bein' so scared? Lost your sense of adventure or somethin'?” She received another whack from the torch by Joe.
     “I am not scared. You shut your face, now.”
     “Will you two love-birds shut the fuck up.” Natalie finally added to the conversation. “Giving me a God-damn headache. Look, it's just some weak shitty tape. Nothing's happened, we walk through and get a fire going, everything will be right as rain.” Amy and Joe fixed each other with an icy stare, but remained silent. Natalie had already started to walk ahead, lifting the tape and looking back to see if they were following. Amy smiled, nodded and stepped under the tape. Joe paused for a couple of extra seconds.
     “What do you mean love-birds?” he accused and sped after the other two, who had rushed on ahead.
     When they reached their moonlit destination, Joe finally caught up. The space shuttle lay in the field over a single grass-covered panel that would have lifted it vertically in order to point it up at the sky for lift-off. It didn't look much different from a plane with the wings at the back instead of in the middle.
     “Could you two try not to leave m-”
     “I thought you weren't scared, Jodie?” Nat interrupted. She always called him Jodie when she was trying to wind him up. Amy just about managed to stifle her laugh.
     “I know Nat's brother ain't here lookin' after us this time, Joe, it's okay if you're scared. You can just walk back on your own, in the dark, all alone.” She shared a look with Nat.
     “Yeah, Jodie. And remember, no funny shit with the girls tonight if you decide to stay, all vulnerable out here far away from civilisation.” They both looked at Joe as seriously as they could manage, watching his fuse slowly burn.
     “Fuck you guys! Actually fuck the both of you!”
     “No, Jodie, that's what I just said not to do!”
     “Right, screw it, I'm leaving, I'm-” Amy caught him by the arm so he couldn't leave.
     “Oh, we're just windin' you up, silly. Honestly! Get a sense of humour.” Amy said through a few of giggles.
     “Oh, I missed you guys so-fucking-much!” Nat smirked at her friends, and then looked up at the abandoned space shuttle, marked with rust; a remnant of the past. It looked just as she remembered, and if anything had changed, it was too dark to tell.

*            *         *

     “How's your bro, Nat? Haven't even spoken to him since that drink he bought me on my twentieth.” Joe asked.
     “Oh, Chris is still a shit.” Nat smiled. “But he's well. Think they moved him again last year, somewhere safer this time, hopefully. Should be getting a phone call on Sunday. I'll let you know.”
      “Cool. I keep forgetting you're sticking around for a while. Welcome back.” They shared a smile. “Didn't Chris tell us about this place, like, why it was here? I used to love his stories, I just never remembered them.” He laughed.
     Amy put on her best impression of Chris she could, lowing her voice and pausing every few words to draw suspense. “...With the American interest in going further into space, however many years ago,” She gestured, with outreached arms, to the sky “Britain would join them. We developed some of our own technology to share with the allies. These shuttles were built to test that...” She paused, pleased with herself. “Or somethin' like that, anyways.”
     “Not a half-bad impression.” Nat smirked. “But yeah, only about three shuttles with that goal in mind were actually launched over here. The rest they took to the US. This shuttle was supposed the be the next launch, but the team were moved a few days before. I'm pretty sure he explained how it had been deactivated, not just abandoned, too. But fucked if I remember.”
     “Hah yeah...” Joe said. “'So no ideas of flying off tonight.' I remember him saying, every time we came. Would be nice to see him again, actually.”
     “I'll tell him you miss him dearly.” Nat laughed. Nobody else spoke for around a minute. The fire's calming growl was nice, it drew her in and her mind wandered.
     “Earth to Nat.” Amy said. This broke her concentration.
     “Yeah, yeah. I'm trying to remember exactly how long ago it all was.” She said, poking down her last batch of wood for a re-fill. “Bloody long time.”
     “I dunno.” Replied Amy “You gettin' all nostalgic on us? Big city life made you forget about us 'til now?”
     “Don't be a fuck-wit! I just wanna figure out the times n' shit. Joe?”
     “Let me think.” He paused, counting on his fingers. “Wait, do you mean when we were last together or when we last camped at the shuttle?”
     “We were last together after my first year of university, which seems like a bloody long time. Four years ago, was it?”
     “Well yeah, you'd have been nineteen, then Amy and I eighteen. So five years before that. Nine years ago. Does seem like a long time when you put it like that...” Joe lost himself in his own thoughts. The firelight faded a little bit, Nat's bag of firewood had run it's course over the couple of hours as they spoke about nothing. Joe, springing back from his daydream, passed her a bottle of cider. It used to be her favourite, though not anymore, but she decided not to say anything, just smile. Amy seemed pleased, though.
     “Cheers, darlin'! So, anyone tellin' any scary stories or somethin' while the fire is alive? What's a camp fire without a scary story?” Amy said and looked at Joe, who looked worried, then Nat in turn.
     “My storytelling is shit, you know it is...” Nat said. “But I did hear this creature story the other day about a tree that eats people. Can't remember what it's called now, but the name translates to 'I-see-you' or some shit. Creepy fucking stuff.” Amy seemed unimpressed.
     “Great, well even if there was a story there, you've sucked the life out of it, ain't ya? Why do-”
     “Um, guys.” Joe cut in. “Can you hear voices?” Amy frowned at him and shook her head.
     “Lame try, dude.”
     “No, seriously I'm not joking. I can hear someone speaking.” Joe said and all three of them listened in silence for a short while.
     “Can't hear shit.” Nat said finally. “Anyway, Aims – I don't think I have any other stories..”
After twenty minutes the fire was almost completely dead, they drank their drinks, took it in turns to pee around the other side of the shuttle, and unscrewed the hatch to go inside.

     It wasn't until their third camping trip to the shuttle, when they were children, that they realised they could get inside. It was bigger than they realised, with rooms in every direction for every purpose. Only Chris was strong enough to open the hatch originally, so when he gave in to their nagging and gave the door a try, they were all very excited about exploring. After they had tired of exploring, they decided to sleep in the cockpit, with all the seats and buttons. What once was wonder, was now awe as Natalie remembered every time they had been here before. The cockpit was clean, which seemed strange as they always used to find their muddy tracks and rubbish from their last trip. However, it had been a long time and they weren't the only people who knew about the shuttle, so she paid it no mind. Each of them sat in their respective seats and continued to talk. Joe slipped into his sleeping bag and sat in his chair, while the girls left theirs on the floor and used their pillows to sit on and warm the seats.
     “We should have brought more food.” Amy started. “I'm getting' hungry again.”
     “Oh, shush,” said Joe “We ate plenty. I brought breakfast, but there's no chance you're starting on it now. You'll get fat.”
     “Maybe I want to be fat!” Amy said with a glare.
     “Oh, you two never stop, do you?” Nat interrupted. “Here, I've got crisps and dip if you want some.” She crunched a few in her mouth to emphasise her point. Amy got up and went over to sit on the arm of Nat's chair and grabbed a stuffed hand from the packet.
     “Thanks, Nat. Best flavour, too! Mmm.” She continued to oversell her enjoyment of the food, quickly glancing back to frown at Joe. Nat started to explain her unhealthy diet from when she was away from home.
     “Umm, guys.” Joe said. “Something's not right.” Though neither of the girls paid him attention. “Guys, we're moving!” He said a bit louder but they continued to ignore him. “Can you not feel that?” Joe shouted above the girls' chatter and the rumble of the raising platform forced them to pay attention. They both stood up and froze in confusion. Amy began sliding to the back of the room, followed by a sleeping bag and two pillows, and after a few more degrees, Natalie.
     “What the fuck is happening?” Nat shouted. “No, seriously, what the actual fuck?”
     Joe slid out of his sleeping bag and jumped down onto the wall, which was now the floor, to join the others. “I don't know, but I really don't like it. Are we taking off? I think we should get out of here.”
     “Obviously we should fucking get out of here, Joe!” Nat replied, but Joe had already started down the rungs which were previously on the floor. Nat followed closely after and realised that Amy was too busy hyperventilating to think for herself, so she grabbed her by the arm until she followed down the ladder.
     Sixty seconds 'til lift off...
     The stoic female voice sent a wave through the ship and a shiver down Nat's spine. She looked below at the ladder to find that Joe hadn't slowed down for them and was already stepping onto the path to the outer hatch.
     Fifty seconds 'til lift off...
     Nat finally made it down to the corridor and saw Joe struggling to twist the wheel on the door. She started towards him, but Amy pushed ahead of her.
     Forty seconds 'til lift off...
     “Get us out! Open the door! Open the door!” Amy barely stopped herself before reaching Joe and grabbed a hold of the wheel alongside him. Pulling with both their strength they couldn't manage to undo it.
     Thirty seconds 'til lit off...
     Walking up just behind the two yanking at the wheel, Nat pressed a glowing green button labelled 'Decompression.' A loud hiss could be heard and the door wheel gave way so fast both Amy and Joe fell.
     Compression compromised, lift off shutting down...
     A brief wave of relief sighed through all three of them, before they realised their next problem. With the door opened, Nat joined the other two in peering down the one-hundred and fifty foot drop to the ground. Further, including the pit where the panel, which was now the only thing holding them up, used to be.
     “Heh, so this thing works.” Nat said after a twenty-ish second silence.
     “How are you so damn calm?” Yelled Joe.
     “I'm bloody not, Aims, I'm just good at dealing with the panic. Anyway, I assume there's a button that puts us back on the floor. Let's go find the shit.”
     “Okay,” Said Joe “Lead the way, then, smart-arse.”
     Minutes went by of the three searching for the right button in the cockpit – or indeed searching for anything that might help. Using the chairs and other various things around the room they had to climb up to where everything was. Amy jumped from one of the back chairs and grabbed onto a handle on the side of the room, which flipped open, dropped her with it, sending papers and packages flying across the room. Amy sat, dazed, in a heap of things. Joe picked up and examined a first aid kit, and Nat picked up a fan-folded paper that looked like a drawing.
     “Well fuck, this might be useful.” She lifted up her page showing the others a full sized map of the shuttle, with all the rooms.
     “Nice find, even if it did cost me a bruise on my arse.” Amy mused. “Maybe there's a manual on the control thingy. Showin' how to set us down, or somethin'.”
     “Shh!” Joe interrupted, for the second time that evening. “I hear talking, do you hear talking?” They all listened, Nat heard a couple of taps on the ladder outside, but they were faint so she dismissed them. There was nobody else on the shuttle with them.
     “Probably something falling, we are the wrong way up and shit.” Nat shrugged and carried on searching.
     “How do you reckon it started anyway, I didn't press anything.” Joe said, almost defensively. Amy frowned.
     “Mhmm, sure. I bet it was you, pressed the big red button or somethin'.”
     “To save another fucking spat,” Nat interrupted. “Let's assume remote access.”
     “Well that would be much worse.” Said Joe. “That would mean someone is actually trying to launch the ship.”
     Compression achieved.
     All three of the young adults froze.
     Sixty seconds 'til lift off...
     They scurried and yanked at the door on the floor. Amy got there first, started pulling it from the wrong way in panic.
     “Oh God, oh God!” Joe started chanting. “I hate time limits...”
     Fifty seconds 'til lift off...
     “Give it the fucker here.” Nat pushed Amy out of the way and tried the door herself. It was locked after all, not just Amy's fault. She searched for a way to unlock the door without much success.
     Forty seconds 'til lift off...
     Thirty seconds 'til lift off...
     Nat finally managed to find a button on an outer wall by a bunch of messy papers, clearly titled 'Lock'. Amy must have knocked it when she fell from the cabinet-of-many-things. She took a moment to appreciate that all the buttons were labelled pretty clearly on the walls. But not the one they needed fifty seconds ago.
     Twenty seconds 'til lift off...
     They raced down the ladder, running to try to open the hatch, again and stop the lift off.
     Ten seconds 'til lift off...
     When Nat reached the corridor she looked just in time to see that as Amy, who had reached the button first, was about to press the green button, it turned red. 9 She pushed it. 8 It did nothing. 7 She pushed it again, 6 and again, and again 5 in stunned silence. 4, 3, 2 Joe looked around at Nat with the widest she had ever seen eyes stretch.
     Lift off...
     The three of them were held fast to the wall in the centrifuge. The rumbling shook Nat's skull to painful levels and she felt intensely sick. She was pretty sure she heard Joe try to speak but the rumbling overwhelmed him. She felt a jolt as the giant fuel tank on the other side of the lifting plate detached itself, having used all it's fuel to push higher into the atmosphere. Before long everything went fuzzy, then it was hard to think, and then there was only blackness.

                                                            *             *           *

     When Natalie woke, she was floating.

     Her vision was blurry and her insides felt strange. There was a distinct smell of vomit. She regained her composure and wriggled around the space ungracefully. She had not trained for this. It wasn't so apparent to her until now how much everything was just that dull grey metal of typical space colours. Why weren't astronauts more invested in some nice scenery, she thought. A few greens would be nice around here. The quiet made itself known, and Natalie felt almost calm, even relaxed. Amy broke her concentration with a groan as she came to. Nat hadn't even noticed her until now and she focused – trying to understand what was happening. She was in space, Amy was here but Joe was not. She shook Amy by the shoulder and motioned for her to follow. The shuffling through space didn't take long to get sort of used to, though they both were a little clumsy. They propelled themselves towards the cockpit using the rungs of the ladder, creating deeply echoed taps through to the other end of the shuttle. The back of the shuttle was eerily dark. Not deep-space blackness, but that artificial darkness accompanying a night-time power cut. She opened the door to the cockpit and pushed herself through. Joe was inside, reading one of the papers scattering the airspace around the room.
     “Where was that map, Nat? The one you had before?”
     “Fuck-sake Joe, how long have you been in here? You seem pretty fucking cosy.” Nat replied. Amy was staring out one of the windows.
     “Oh wow, oh wow, oh wow. Guys, we're actually in space! Floatin' around... in space!” She squeaked in excitement, Nat scarce thought she'd seen Amy this excited before.
     “Am I the only one here who understands the shit-storm we're in right now? Y'know, fearing for my fucking life?”
     Joe looked up from his page. “Trust me, when I say I'm more scared than you are, Nat. But you were the one talking about dealing with the panic. Anger isn't helping me look for this page, is it!”
     “No, Jodie, it isn't! But neither will passive-damn-aggression.
     “You ain't understandin' this, are you guys? We're in spaaaaace!” Amy pitched in, they both looked at her with fury. “Jesus, can we not enjoy this for a little bit? Who gets a chance to go into space?”
     “I'd have loved to go into space with you, Amy.” Nat said. “But not a fucking one-way trip.” Amy looked a bit stunned and went back to the window. Joe held up his hand.
     “Look, I fully understand you're a bit unhappy, Nat. But Amy doesn't deserve this and it's really not helping. We could at least find a way out... I can't do this on my own.” Nat took a few breaths before replying. “Please?” He added.
     “Right, okay. I stuffed the map in my pocket, it's here.” She felt around her pockets and found nothing. “Shit, I must have dropped it.”
     “Probably the zero-gees!” Amy said. Nat nodded and swam her way back to the corridor, to find when she dropped it.

     With Amy and Nat both looking away, Joe took the moment to try and calm himself a little and put his hands over his face. A single tear escaped and floated upwards. When he opened his eyes, he saw the globule and caught it, Amy saw the whole thing.
     “You're tryin' too hard to be tough, dude. You don't have to, we're all friends here.” Amy smiled, and Joe faked a smile back.
     “I know, I just figured one of us would have to take control, you know?”
     “Then just let Nat do it. And stop pretendin' you're any kind o' leader. We all know she thrives on bossing others.”
     “...yeah.” He said, and let out a single genuine laugh. Natalie slid through the door and Joe held her gaze. “About thirty seconds.”
     “What?” Nat asked.
     “Before you two came in, I was only here for about thirty seconds. I was hardly planning a wedding.”
     “Oh, al'right. Point noted. I have the map here, anyway.”
     “Good, can you read it? It's difficult to focus on something when my hands are shaking like a Richter nine.” Nat hesitated for a second before swallowing hard and gave a sharp nod.

     “Okay, so it seems pretty straight forward from here. We're at the nose, up this way.” Nat, held the print up and pointed. “The corridor goes down the middle of the shuttle. The rooms branch off. Here, we have bedrooms. Here are bathrooms.”
     “Fantastic, I could use the bathroom.”
     “Shush, Amy, I'm speaking. Besides, you don't even know how to pee without gravity.” This stopped Amy in her thoughts, Nat could see her trying to figure it out. “Anyway... Here we have an infirmary, where I assume they also keep the space suits, as I saw on a film once. Here is a kitchen. I have no idea what this empty space is. But if I can remember from nine or ten years ago, that's probably a leisure room, or something. At the back here we have a fuck-off big area for storage and astronaut shit. Here is our point of interest, though, lady and lord. This room here, in this little bit of writing, claims to have an escape capsule.” Both Amy and Joe's eyes lit up at the sound of that. “So. We have three options. We try to find a radio, to call for help. We use the escape capsule to get back to Earth. Or we could hope there is some kind of auto pilot that will take us down as we are. As we do not know if any of these will work, let's just do all fucking three.”
     “Okay,” said Amy “I guess I can go lookin' for the escape pod.” Joe turned toward the controls and started looking at each little gadget.
     “Right, and I'll look for a radio. Can't be too hard.”
     “Which leaves me rummaging through the fucking paperwork. Thanks, guys.” Said Nat, who immediately caught a couple of pages floating about and tried to make a pile. Amy pushed her way to the door of the main cabin and stared down the lone and increasingly dark corridor. She paused for a long while before she said anything.
     “Yeah, I'm not going down there without a light switch.” She said. Nat laughed.
     “I doubt there'll just be a flicky switch on the wall, but most of the shit around is labelled.”
     “But what if it's not here? I ain't goin' out there on my lonesome!” Amy closed the door again and crossed her arms so violently, she began to front-flip on the spot. She grabbed something to stabilise herself. Nat laughed at her again.
     “Honestly, we're here alone – I don't know what you're scared of.”
     “Well,” Joe chipped in. “How do you know? Maybe there's a team of people running it from the back.” He shrugged. Nat rolled her eyes.
     “Like fuck is there! They'd need to use this room, or they'd have at least heard us talking or some other shit. It was either an accident or the rocket was launched remotely.”
     “Whatever, Nat. I can't see any radio here. So I'll go with you, Amy, and we can find some lights and the rest.”
     “Thankin' you, Joe.” Amy opened the door again, and slowly used the wall to scale further down. Joe caught up and braced himself alongside her against the other wall and Nat saw them fade further into the black. A sudden sense of dread befell her.
     “Wait, hold the fuck up! Don't leave me on my own!” Nat grabbed the ladder and used it to speed up behind the other two. Who were laughing at her.
     “I thought you weren't scared.” They said in unison, and looked at each other in confusion.
     “Oh, shut-up. Trying to use auto-pilot is a stupid idea anyway, none of us know anything about this shit.”
     “Well that's why the research was your job. But fair point.” Said Joe
     “Look, let's just stick together, al'right?” Nat said. Amy nodded and grabbed Nat by the arm. They carried on down the corridor, Joe used his torch when it started to get a bit too dark. They looked in at the bedrooms and kitchen, which were pitch black. Amy stopped in the bathroom and it took her almost fifteen minutes to figure out how it worked, meanwhile Joe went back to finish off the crisps and dip. When they regrouped, they seemed in fairly decent spirits until it caught Nat's attention that one of the lights was on in one of the doors down the corridor. Joe turned his torch off and they swam each other to the window and looked inside.
     A man wearing large headphones with a microphone stared stunned back at the three people in the shuttle. All three of whom were speechless. His face through the small porthole window began to shrink after a huge crack sounded from inside the door. The escape capsule drifted slowly away from them. Before long, the entire pod was in full view and all four people involved simply remained dumbfounded. The capsule could easily have fit seven or eight people, though it carried only one passenger who's lips began to move. He was shouting something, but only silence could be heard.
     “So, that was our escape?” Amy said, finally. Joe was too busy hyperventilating to answer and neither Amy or Joe noticed the tears drip out of Natalie. Her heart was a sunken ship wreck, and she was going to drown. It was Amy that started moving toward the cockpit, dragging Joe behind her. Nat couldn't bring herself to move from her spot, so she remained slumped – deflated by the apparent inevitable.
     “Fuck” She shouted, turned, and slammed her fist on the door behind her, which pushed open. Crackling speech filled the solemn quiet of the corridor, causing Joe and Amy to turn back as quick as they could.
     “The radio?” Nat sniffed. Amy pushed in front of her inside the room and Joe got out his torch, having calmed down somewhat in the face of help. When they entered, the lights turned on automatically. The room was filled with a station board, computers, comm. units and microphones. It was the room that Nat wasn't sure of on the map, which turned out to be where the radios were. So perhaps their chances were a tiny amount higher than fucked.
     “Can you... me. Who... Ah, damn... Need....” The radio failed to stay on for long. It was Amy who picked up a microphone closest to where the sound was coming out and spoke back. The man kept talking, breaking up, but sounded as if he did hear something back.
     “Wait, I'll... and... should, fix...” the voice continued until eventually it cleared and a slick stream vented through the room. “Can you hear me? Am I coming through?” Nat pushed Amy out of the way and grabbed the microphone.
     “Yes! Yes, we can hear you. What the fuck is going on?”
     “Smooth, Nat.” Joe added.
     “I don't know how you got in there, but you really weren't supposed to be.” The voice replied. “Listen, I can't be giving you all the deets, but I can tell you, to be sure, you need to get off that shuttle.” Nat frowned.
     “That's not helpful, you shit! Bring the capsule back!”
     “No can do, I'm afraid. I've been pushed into orbit. The shuttle is low flying, so slowly in about two days I'll get low enough, with enough speed, to break the atmos; no return trips. Thing is, I don't know much about that shuttle, I wasn't the one who reactivated it, I was just assurance to see it off. It was meant to look like an accident.” There was regret in the man's voice.
     “What was? What was an accident? Tell us everything you know, it might help us escape.” Nat showed no intention of lowering her voice. The pause at the other end was long.
     “I'm sorry. To be sure, I am.” He eventually said, slowly and carefully. “But it's worth more than your lives. I can't tell you anything.” This took a few seconds to fully sink in.
     “You.. Fucking... Wh-” Joe snatched the microphone away from Nat before she could continue.
     “Look,” He said. “I'm sorry for my friend, but I'm getting pretty sick of floating about, here. What are our chances of getting off this shuttle?” The man took a few seconds to respond.
     “Slim. I don't wanna lose you all hopes or nothin', but you were in the worst place at the worst possible time. I know the radio ain't connected up to Earth, but who knows what else is there? If you do find a way back, make sure nothing comes back with you, capiche? And, eh, don't tell anyone about this, or I can't ensure your lucky lives will last. Anyway, good luck.”
     “Wait, what?” When there was no response, Joe repeated himself. “Who are you? What do you mean? Please, don't just leave us!” The radio was dead.
     “What a prick!” Nat shouted and hit the desk. She noted that Amy was being particularly reserved, and went over to give her a hug. They both needed it. Joe held his head in his hands. The persistent darkness outside the room didn't help matters, the ship was just smatterings of grey through an abundance of blackness. Joe hadn't given up, however, he looked in each of the other rooms with his torch while the others simply followed – having no ideas of what else to do. Though Nat wasn't sure what Joe was looking for, she still held an element of hope that they could find something.

                                                              *           *           *

     It was inside the storage room that 'something' was found. The room was a vast expanse filled with crates and tubes and basic storage equipment. In the middle of the room laid a cylindrical container with mist pouring out of the sides, it was the only thing that caused any motion in the room, so it was hard for them to not keep returning their gaze towards it. Though after searching around the room for something, anything, Joe found a few canisters that seemed like they were used the hold samples of rocks or things.
     “Hey guys, I'm pretty sure I saw one of the paper thingies about these – they're used for samples to send back to Earth without returning, which means there's a chute or something to send them.”
     “Interesting,” Nat said, “So what? We can send our death letters back to earth? How fucking optimistic.”
     “What's in there?” Amy interrupted, pointing at what seemed like a handle to a wardrobe behind the sample canisters clipped to the wall. She made her way over, helping Joe move everything out of the way and opened it up. And it could have been their ticket home, all three of them thought it. Joe spoke first.
     “You take the piss all you want, Nat. But we could always try sending ourselves home.” Behind the doors were a set of six capsules, just like the sample canisters, but much larger. Potentially large enough to fit a human or two inside.
     “I'm pretty sure that's not safe, we'd suffocate in one of those.” Amy said.
     “Not if we had a supply of oxygen,” Joe begun. “Besides, you heard the guy say we're in low orbit, if we pushed straight down, we might be able to break the atmosphere sooner. It'll likely have a tracker and parachute for when we get close.”
     “Fantastic, but that doesn't explain how we're randomly gettin' oxygen, Joe.”
     “Space suits.” Nat said, half to herself. When she realised the two were staring at her, she explained. “It might be a bit of a squeeze, but space suits are designed to regulate and time your oxygen, I think, anyway. Shit, we could probably fit a couple of bonus tanks in the capsule if we go alone.” She didn't like that last part, speeding through space alone wasn't an inviting concept. Though it could be their only way home. She also knew Joe would get quite claustrophobic, he hesitated before he spoke.
     “It's worth a try. Help me carry three of these out, then.” They carried the first one out towards the room where the escape capsule was released, then a second. The work was awkward and clumsy, as while the objects weren't heavy in the zero gravity, they were still big and fairly hard to navigate by three amateurs.
     On the third capsule, Amy got nudged back by the tail end and fell into a few of the smaller canisters, now free-floating, and sent them spinning across the room. One of the canisters hit a clip on the side of the smoking pot on the floor and it flipped open. All three looked at it. The lid gently rose without any resistance and what fell up out of it looked like a ball of darkness. The ball rose into the centre of the room and neither of the three could quite understand what it was, it seemed otherworldly, as if made of non-human materials. Before Nat could second-guess that she saw it twitch, a singular fat tentacle-thing folded out of the mass, followed by another and another. There were nine tentacles in total, before what was previously was a ball was now an unnatural starfish. None of them said anything, but when Joe decided to shine his torch on the blackness-material object, it shimmered, almost metallic.
     When it moved, Amy jumped. It's chubby extremities pulsed inward to spindly ones and back, it's mass stretched a couple of times and it started writhing, flailing in the lack of gravity. It seemed like it couldn't get any control. The three could not take their eyes off of it, and eventually it stopped flinging it's limbs about wildly and executed a perfect spin, stopping and spreading out like a child-drawn sun. Only, without the light. It started to drift towards Joe, who, when it was close enough, ducked out of the way and left it drifting onto the wall. It stuck to the wall with an unknown grip.
     “I'm going to guess that nobody else has any idea what the hell that thing is?” Amy asked, but didn't expect an answer. Seeing it closer up, it was a few feet across, just over half the height of Nat, in all directions. When it was stuck to the wall, it's middle swelled, making it like a dome. Joe shined the light directly onto it, and she saw that it was moving, like it was covered in tiny cilia that really grossed her out. She hated it. It reacted to the long exposure to the torch, shrunk and started moving towards the source. This time it was fast. Really fast. Amy let out a gasp, and when Joe wasn't quick enough, it wrapped a spindly limb around his leg. He cried out as if in pain, and Amy screamed. Nat did all she could she could think to do, which was to shove the large capsule towards it, in the hope to knock it off. Before she could, it already started at Amy, drawn to the noise.
     The crawling mass stopped short of reaching Amy and, instead, seemed distracted by the open door. It slowed down significantly, resuming it's sun-like form and drifted in that direction as it if had no interest in the other three life-forms in the room at all. Joe came to his senses.
     “We can't let that thing out of here!” He said, clutching his shin which had burn marks in place of missing clothing. Nat thought quickly. There was a smaller capsule floating just by the side of her, so she sent it flying towards the door, knocking it just enough to leave a half-inch gap.
     “Not with us inside!” Screeched Amy, who was separated from the other two by the thing. From outside of their view, however, Joe had already managed to pull the freezer chamber it emerged from off of the ground and was hurdling towards it, presumably in an attempt to catch it. The thing, without any warning, stopped exactly as it was. As Joe got closer, it started expanding, fanning it's self out thinner, like a net. It was going to catch a twenty-something male, and successfully. It wrapped around to form a hollow husk around Joe, who couldn't stop himself in time, and it started closing in. In the gaps between the tentacles, Nat was certain she was about to see her friend die.
     He punched his hand out, and pulled it back just as swift, as if touching something burning, and in doing so, he pushed the container. The cold rim touched the creature, forcing it to retract. It reacted violently, thrashing out, soundlessly. But by the time it started to grow again, the three had already raced to the door and shut it inside. It pressed itself up flat against the little window of the door. From the outside, it just looked like a lightless room. Though if you looked closely enough, you would see the oddly oily shimmer of a thousand maggoty cilia. Nat shuddered, Joe had severe burns on his hand and leg and Amy just stared at the porthole window. After a fair few seconds of shock, a sound knocked them into action. A feint hissing sound.
     “Is it... burnin' through the door?”Amy asked.
     “I don't want to wait to find out.” Joe replied, and what followed took just under an hour to prepare. Nat went to the infirmary, to confirm she was correct in assuming it was where the space suits were. She got them all out, found ones that would kind-of-fit all three, packed the extra oxygen tanks and figured out how they worked so that she could show the others. Joe went up to the main cabin to find out exactly how the capsules worked. They only had two, so it was important to figure out if it were possible to do. Amy mainly stayed in the communications room and occasionally checked on the 'alien' to make sure it hadn't melted out from storage. What turned out to be fifty three minutes and a hissing door later, they were ready. Time was tight, so they had to decide.
     “The bad news,” Joe began. “Is that the switch has to be pressed from the outside first with one capsule at the front of the launcher. That means two people in the first one, and someone on their own.”
     “I'll do it,” Said Nat without hesitation. “I'll be fine.” Joe wasn't about to question her, she knew he would prefer to be with someone else considering he would get claustrophobic anyway.
     “Okay. The good news is the second one will follow afterwards on a timer, giving you time to get in and ready before.” They all nodded at this, and Nat prepared the capsules. Amy got inside first, suited up, with two bonus oxygen tanks and slid down, what now seemed like, the missile. After Amy was secure, Joe got in, lining up his face with the thick window hatch, which Nat left open from the outside.
     “Remember, you each have eight-ish hours of oxygen in there. I don't know how long this will take, or if we will make it.” She looked over at the more imminent threat in the storage room. “But it's a damn sight better than staying here. Even when your oxygen runs low, stay calm. Fucking calm. You'll make it eventually.” And with that, Joe nodded. Nat pressed a few buttons and gave herself a one and a half minute timer afterwards. Amy and Joe were slid forwards and then they were gone. Nat took one last peer at the blackness behind the door, and secured her helmet, stuffed the oxygen tanks below her and got in, closing the lid behind her. She too, left open the little hatch, so that she could see outside. It scared her to think about seeing so much space, but it was vital to know if she was going to hit the atmosphere or not. She couldn't help but think how little room she had to manage her oxygen tanks, she was trapped fairly tight. She was tensing all of her muscles and the next thing she felt was herself drop. She had been been launched.

                                                                *        *        *

     After a few hours, space was surprisingly peaceful. She figured out she needed to use her feet to drag up the oxygen tanks, but she could just about manage it. She had no concept of how far away she was from Earth or if she would even make it in time. It seemed very likely, given the speeds of things, and quick assumptions in her head.

     All she could see out of the window, between her condensing breaths on her helmet, was the infinite darkness of space, scattered with a handful of stars. It was during what she thought was the third hour, when her capsule span in view of a large satellite. In the unhindered view of the structure, she spotted a single fat tentacle pressed against the window.

Dissertation - Does John Austin Play Old Harry With The Fact Value Distinction?

Does John Austin Play Old Harry With The Fact / Value Distinction?
An investigation into the moral motivations of language.

Kyle Michael Sweet
April 2014

I, Kyle Michael Sweet, declare that all work found within this paper is composed by myself, and that the presented work is that of my own.
All work which is not entirely my own has been referenced in accordance with the system demanded by the university of Northampton.
Word Count: 8530


Date: 23 / 04 / 2014
------------------------------------------------------------------


Does John Austin Play Old Harry With The Fact / Value Distinction?
An investigation into the moral motivations of language.


Chapter 1: Motivations and John Austin
It is not only worthy of note, but rather a necessity in understanding human actions, that our motivations are at the core of everything we do. With regard to this, it is completely within reason for testimony to be the greatest motivational force, for we wholeheartedly rely on the testimony of those we trust by means of advice, education and welfare in our everyday lives. The giving and taking of advice plays a fundamental place in such everyday things (i.e. friendships, professional practices, parenting, and so on), that nobody seems to be exempt from the influence of others. Predominantly, it seems to be the intention of giving advice that the person takes that advice and, therefore, carry out the advice given (Winch; Gingell: 2008). Even those in such a remote setting as a solitary hunter-gatherer tribe would learn by means of others when to stop running after a creature or which berries not to eat, despite nearly having caught the creature, or being very hungry, if it were not to benefit them. I believe it to be implausible for anyone from any walk of life to survive very long, or at least lead a healthy life, by purely relying on base desires and uninfluenced reason alone as their motivations.
It would seem, then, that it would be of great use to have a grasp on the notion of motivational language, and more precisely, the kinds of things that motivate and the kinds of things that do not. An understanding of this would benefit us both philosophically, by understanding morals, and professionally, in practices such as medicine, counselling or teaching.
It has been proposed for some time now, beginning with Hume, that there is a distinction between facts and values (Hume: 1739). The explanations of these two types of sentence largely cause the disparity between the sciences and ethics. The idea is that factual statements are assertions that can be true or can be false, and, evaluative statements cannot be true or false but are merely utterances, such as expressions of emotions or exclamations.
Hume gives his account of evaluations as coming from the passions and are neither true nor false - they are distinctly about emotions and do not involve reason. Hume reflects that it is these evaluations that would move us, as rationality and reason on their own are incapable of moving us at all. Though, as much of a bold statement as this is, Hume seems not to offer any real defence of this case, but rather leaving it on the note that moral evaluations are not things that are about the world. It appears, however, to have almost been an after-thought in his explanations upon morality that there is any real separation between 'is / is not' and 'ought / ought not' (which is very much the same distinction, with facts being 'is / is not' and evaluations being 'ought / ought not'), as he claims to have observed that many philosophers seem to have confused one for the other. This appears as a small paragraph whereby he explains that of reading people who speak of morality, they seem to begin with ideas of 'is', that give explanation, and end in making the claims of 'ought', that require explanation. This single paragraph has caused much influence and is truly the only place he actually suggests the idea of a clear fact / value distinction. From Hume, it is suggested as the 'is-ought problem'. This has largely influenced the basis of moral thinking for the past two-hundred and fifty years, stemming all kinds of explanations and theories.
While influential as an idea, it did not seem to be a thing of much importance to Hume, and so J. L. Mackie was one of the major philosophers who built upon this to make a clear and important distinction between facts and values (Mackie: 1977). Seeing it as a truly moral issue, Mackie asserted 'there are no moral facts' in which he seems to be clarifying the distinction further between the two proposed types of sentences, using the ideas of objectivity and subjectivity. The claim here is that all evaluative statements are subjective, and all factual statements are objective; this is because facts are about truths and falsities, and so they are not emotive, as values are. As, he claims, there are no truths in morality; all moral statements are emotive and, therefore, can motivate, while there can be no moral facts on the basis that factual statements cannot motivate.
This distinction is still an idea that remains today, even though it seems to cause philosophical problems as John Austin points out in the book 'How To Do things With Words' (A collection of lectures by Austin, formed into a book, by J. O. Urmson). Austin makes this bold claim in the opening lecture about the fact / value distinction, which he calls the 'descriptive fallacy' (The notion of when someone mistakes value utterances as statements). He suggests that many philosophers have made "the mistake of taking, as straightforward statements of fact, utterances which are either nonsensical or else something entirely different" (Austin: 1955). The claim here is to suggest that philosophers often took too much from the ideas of sentences as statements, and have not been recognising the possibility of types of sentences that are not facts and have no intention of trying to be facts. This is one issue brought about by the fact / value distinction, as the idea that a philosopher is capable of analysing any sentence as if it is a statement of fact, and so even evaluative statements seem to be sometimes considered as opinions trying to be facts, which, according to Austin, is a mistake. Rather, Austin seems to be suggesting that there is a problem with a separation between such distinctions as facts and values. This is because nobody can truly analyse utterances as straightforward statements of fact; including 'facts', as there are other things to consider, such as context, which gets largely ignored by philosophers in the analysis of language.
Reading further into Austin's lectures, however, it becomes largely apparent that he never actually addresses this issue that he seems to claim is there. Despite suggesting that the changing tide of this could be an important revolution in philosophy, at no point does he make the link clear between what he is trying to say and how it disproves ideas such as the fact / value distinction. However, this is not necessarily the fault of Austin, as upon his death he had not finished his lectures, and it could have been entirely possible that his connection was a lecture yet to come. Though, through the fate of his death, these ideas still deserve to be built upon, and not simply abandoned.
As a result, my intention here is simply to explain this link and show, quite clearly, how Austin's notions of speech acts do, in fact, play old harry (the devil) with the fact / value distinction, to the extent that it simply cannot be a plausible idea and needs to be abolished. We need to get beyond this oversimplification of moral language that has been hanging over philosophy for so long. Having already reflected upon the importance of this matter and the benefit of doing so, it should be further explained that Austin's ideas, while strong, offer no comprehensive explanation to the possible types of sentences – he merely shows language up in its complex nature. In this explanation, it is still left open for anyone else to offer an alternative notion to a language distinction that makes more sense than the fact / value, as that is not something I will be offering myself. I shall be arguing for the notion that language is much more complicated than is suggested by simplistic notions of a two, or even three or four, category distinction. Before, though, I continue on in explaining the details of Austin's work, I shall explain, upfront, and be clear on exactly how Austin's work does show up the fact / value distinction as nothing more than nonsense, and thus avoiding the similar fate in never fully explaining myself.
In pointing out the basis for the problems caused by a descriptive fallacy, Austin reflects on the idea that philosophers are an all too serious bunch who have taken the ideas of sentences too much as statements, and, as a result, have ignored the concept of context. In pointing this out, he proposes new ideas that attempt to explain not only what has been uttered, but also the intention behind what is being uttered and the possible effect that has on the receiver of the utterance. With this explanation, Austin does two things that cause major issues for the fact / value distinction. Firstly, he shows that it is entirely possible to have facts that motivate, values that do not motivate and also other possible sentence types that also can motivate or not motivate. This fades the definitions between facts and values, showing that they both seem to be the same thing. Secondly, he shows that language is more complicated than the meanings of sentences, as there are many variables in someone saying something that means it would be difficult to define any sentence as a set of categories, i.e. facts or values.


Chapter 2: Evaluative Statements
Let us, then, gain an understanding of motivational language by examining Austin's theory of the three parts that make up all speech acts: The locutionary act, the illocutionary force and the perlocutionary effect.
Firstly, the 'locutionary act' can be simply explained as 'what was said' – this is what is commonly considered and analysed in most philosophy of language, and taking these locutions prima facie is where Austin suggests many previous philosophers have made a mistake, as the locution can be an entirely ambiguous thing. The locution, such as “Don't do that!”, “Yes, please.”, “The cooker is hot.”, “That is bad.”, “Billy has left the room.” or “Help, Dorothy is dead!”, etc. are all utterances, in any form, that can or has been said. This is the simplest of the three parts of speech acts, and only takes into consideration what has actually been uttered. To follow on from this is the meaning behind the locution act, which Austin calls the 'illocutionary force'. The illocutionary force is what the person is trying to say or suggest with what they actually said. This could be to promise, advise, recommend, congratulate, declare, assert and so on to any real meaning of the locution. Furthermore, this is a largely context driven part of the speech act, as there are sentences that would require you to understand the situation in order to know what the person means by what they said. For example in the locution “there is a spider over there” could potentially mean: 'I warn you that there is a spider over there', 'I recommend you get rid of that spider over there', or 'I assert that there is a spider over there.' all dependent on the context. This is where many philosophers did not consider context, as, on paper, 'there is a spider over there' simply seems to mean 'I assert that there is a spider over there', and yet given a situation where someone who is deathly afraid of spiders says the locution, it seems that to assume they are simply making a statement of fact would be a mistake, rather they are most likely advising you to get rid of the spider.
The final part of the speech act can be broken up into two parts and is known as the 'perlocutionary effect'. This is, again, following on from the illocution and is about the effect that the locution and illocution has on the hearer. For example: 'He persuaded me to get rid of the spider.' and then 'I got rid of the spider.'. This is split into two parts, because the effect your speech has on someone and the actions brought about by that are still separate things and one does not necessarily mean the other, such as 'he persuaded me to get rid of the spider. But I did not manage get rid of the spider, because I am also deathly afraid of spiders, and wouldn't go near it'. With the perlocutionary effect we can see the motivational force of language, as the illocutionary force generates a perlocutionary effect, it shows that a single speech act in the right context seems to do things in the world around us. It is important to note, here, that this will not always be the case – as with any testimony, we do not have to accept it, and often if we do not trust or like the person we are talking to, the illocutionary force will have no effect on us. The context driven part of any perlocution is usually about who the speaker is and who the hearer is, as, whatever your intention or meaning in saying something, only certain people will accept it and give the desired effect. It is also worthy of note that the illocution and perlocution are not usually conscious things, as most people do give advice, though that advice will simply be to make an utterance; what meaning that utterance has and the hope that the effect may follow are often not consciously considered by the speaker, as much as being the subconscious intention of the speaker. As a final note, it is aptly pointed out by Austin that, within analysing language and speech acts, we are ignoring circumstances such as acting where the speech act is merely a pretence of a real speech act, and largely has no real force or effect.
So, in clarification, The speech act is broken up into three parts, the locution (What was said), the illocution (What was meant) and the perlocution (The effect). This can be demonstrated into the following example:
    A) Locution: “X is a good film.”
    B) Illocution: They recommend that I watch X.
    C1) Perlocution: I am persuaded to watch X.
    C2) I watch X.
For argument's sake, let us suggest that the perlocutions C1 and C2 are the same and the fact that I am persuaded to watch X does actually mean that I do watch X, and so forth for most perlocutionary effects. In the example, if someone were to suggest to me that, say, Fight Club is a good film, it seems reasonable that this is a recommendation of the film. In the event of being told that Fight Club is a good film, I may very well be motivated to watch the film as someone has told me the film is good. However, suppose the person carrying out the speech act has a bad judgement on films, and in the past, every film they have claimed was good has turned out to be awful! It seems, in this case, to lose the persuasive effect it had in the first case and would be more along the lines of: “Fight Club is a good film.”, 'They recommended that I watch Fight Club', 'I avoided watching Fight Club'.
Here, we can see the three parts of the speech act in practice, and that they plainly follow on from each other given the right contexts. This example is an example of what Mackie would call an evaluative statement, as there is no true or false to the locution, only an opinion intended to persuade or motivate. Through Austin's speech acts we can clearly see that not only is it an evaluative statement and has motivational force, but also how that happens. Even though the speaker may have asserted 'Fight Club is a good film' not as a recommendation nor actually intending the effect of me watching it, it still potentially has this effect. For example, suppose I approach two friends who were already in the midst of a debate as to whether Fight Club is a good film. One friend states: “Fight Club is a good film" and the other, in truly witty form, follows with "No, Fight Club is a bad film!". Neither of my friends in their locutions has any real intention of persuading me to watch the film. Though it seems likely that in hearing this, I may be taking my friend's views into account and thus am weighing up whether or not to watch the film, and they are inadvertently either persuading me to or persuading me not to watch Fight Club.
Utterances of an evaluative nature seem to be able to motivate, then, as we are simply trusting (or not trusting) the testimony of those around us, because (avoiding the aesthetics debate of objectivity in art) there seems not to be any truths or falsities in asserting a preference. So, what about a different type of evaluative example? One that is not a preference, but rather a promise:
    A) “I will stay here.”
    B) They promise that they will remain where they are.
    C1) I am persuaded they will remain where they are.
    C2) I leave in the hope of returning to them; I am comforted by their sticking with me; I trust them not to leave the stuff behind; etc.
As shown here in the perlocutionary effect, there are many contexts where “I will stay here” could be uttered, and similarly to the preference stated in the previous example, it is attempting to have the effect of persuading me. This is a different type of evaluative statement to the previous one, because it does not seem to be asserting any type of fact about the world, or preference to how good or bad something is, but merely making a promise. It is of moral consideration that promises, within reason, should be kept, and, as a result, it seems the have the effect of persuading me or not persuading me depending on who the speaker is and the context it is spoken. If, for example, I was badly hurt and could not move, one friend goes to get help and another says “I will stay here”, they are making the promise that they will stay with me, so it is up to myself or the person who is leaving to trust whether or not they will do as they promise. In this case, it seems most likely that they will keep the promise. However, if, in the example, I am at the pub with a group of friends whom all want to leave to get a drink, the least trusted member of the group states “I will stay here” it may have the effect of my not trusting him to look after our stuff, so this may have the effect of me staying with him, so that he is not left alone.
Though considered as an evaluative statement, this example locution of “I will stay here” is also making an assertion that does blur the line slightly between facts and values, as it seems it is possible for there to be a truth or false factor to it. If someone makes the promise that they intend to stay where they are, and they do, is it not true that they have stayed where they were, and, in fact, was true when they stated 'I will stay here'? Though it can be argued that it is still a subjective notion as there are other factors that might make it impossible for them to keep their promise, so, for now, we shall accept that this fits under Mackie's definition of a motivating evaluative sentence.
So, both of these examples show the use of evaluative statements, and that they can be used in vastly different ways to different effects according to the context. As they are both different, however, we can show that pretty much any evaluative statement can have this motivational force as the illocution seems to always follow what was said. Even if the evaluative sentence was not about persuading, but rather to advise, or congratulate, or other such illocutions, it seems all of these would have some form of motivational force. Austin makes this clarification in the circumstance of the utterance as an important factor as we may say things such as “Coming from her, I am not sure she was sincere” or, to use Austin's example, “Coming from him, I took it as an order, not as a request". Evaluative statements largely come from whether or not we trust a person's testimony, and that, in turn, is dependant on the circumstance or the context of the testimony.
Austin's use of the speech act, here, demonstrated by these values, do not directly go against the fact / value distinction as we have only shown the motivational force of values, which is what Mackie suggests, though, rather than showing just that they do motivate, we have shown how they motivate and also that they may not motivate at all. With the clarification of the illocution, we can suggest that there are many ways in which a value may motivate, be it to persuade or declare or otherwise, and even these different kinds exhibit different effects in different contexts – often showing that there is no effect, as the context given did not motivate the hearer at all. So it already seems a push to simplify this as a single category by claiming 'all values motivate' as, often, they do not motivate. Rather it is much apter to claim that 'values have the potential to motivate' which is a broad notion that accepts language to be so complicated. Next, then, with this in mind, we shall examine factual statements.


Chapter 3: Factual Statements
Facts, to Mackie and Hume, are things about the world. They are things of reason, and factual statements can either be true or false. In this regard it is thought that statements of fact can never motivate; facts are objective assertions and have no bearing on how you 'ought' or 'ought not' act. This would set them apart from evaluative sentences, and, in the same way I have shown situations to suggest evaluations have the potential to not motivate, I will show, using the same method, that factual statements do have the potential to motivate. Let us, then, take an example of a factual sentence and see how it works under the notion of a speech act.
“That knife is very sharp” is a factual sentence as, prima facie, all that is being asserted is a property of the knife, as a thing about the world. Naturally, the degree of sharpness will mean different things to different people, so let us assume that 'very sharp' means 'sharp enough to easily cut you', then we may suggest the following context for the speech act:
    A) “That knife is very sharp.”
    B) They advise that I not touch that knife.
    C1) I am persuaded that the knife could be dangerous.
    C2) I avoid the knife.
With this example, it seems that the apparent assertion of a fact is actually a word of advice, rather than a mere statement. More importantly, this is a fact that, given context, seems to be able to motivate. Not only is the factual sentence being said with the intention to motivate through the illocution (B), but also through the perlocution (C) is it more than likely that I have been motivated to act in some way. Now if the situation is changed, perhaps it can motivate in other ways. It may be that, in a very morbid sense, I am suicidal and while I am with someone they say “That knife is very sharp”, fully with the same intention as in the first situation. This may motivate me in a way separate to the intention of the speaker (to avoid the knife), and motivate me to use that knife on myself. The perlocution in this example is completely irrespective of the illocution, in that they have not motivated me in the way they expected, but I have still been motivated by the mere utterance of the locution (A).
It is worthy of note, that much like in the evaluation example, this is not always going to have a motivational effect. In that if someone asserts “That knife is very sharp” in an attempt to make me avoid the knife, I may either not believe them, or simply ignore them and go on to touch the knife anyway, perhaps cutting myself, or merely not touch the knife regardless of what was said, as I was never going to anyway.
This example, then, seems very similar to evaluative examples in the potential it has to motivate, as facts are not supposed to be able to do, as well as not motivate – and this largely depends on the context. In fact, if we look at the previous example of the argument in a pub about a film being good, perhaps we can extend this here and say that a chef and a weapons expert were to argue, each with their own standard of sharpness. The chef may assert “that knife is very sharp” and the weapons expert may state the opposite: “That knife is not very sharp”, while it is a thin line to argue semantics, it is still possible that different standards could be considered. This would perhaps have some type of motivation to me; if either one of these people makes the claim “that knife is very sharp”, I, with little knowledge or experience with knives outside of my own kitchen, may be persuaded to believe the knife is sharp regardless of the other's opinion that it is not, as it is probably sharp enough for me.
The point here is simply to suggest that there are different standards involved with notions as 'sharpness', and as a result it may be suggested that this example is a poor excuse for a factual sentence. While they would be wrong about this – because it is a factual sentence under the standards I am arguing against – let us give this opinion the benefit of the doubt and take another example.
    A) “Billy has left the room”
    B) They warn me that Billy has left the room.
    C1) I am aware that Billy has left the room.
    C2) I run after Billy.
As a sentence, it is making an assertion about the world to say “X has left the room” and can either be true of false. The statement of fact is that X has actually left the room; there is no standard to which X may not have left the room. Thus, this is a fact with no notion of standard being involved. Here, then, the situation may be that I am trying to keep an eye on Billy whilst talking to someone else; after I am warned that Billy has left the room, I may be worried that he will get into trouble and so I am motivated to retrieve or follow Billy. So even in this fact example there seems a possibility to motivate. Though, can the situation change, and it still motivate?
    A) “Billy has left the room.”
    B) They advise me to start talking about Billy.
    C1) I am made aware that I can talk about Billy.
    C2) I start talking about Billy.
Now, while I may not particularly be a nice person for specifically talking about Billy behind his back, in this example it could be that I wish to share information about Billy, but am being careful to do so. Upon being told “Billy has left the room” I am being advised that it is now okay to begin saying what I wished to say about Billy. This type of sentence can be used in different situations and the illocution comes through in these contexts, often if the locution would be ambiguous in a situation it is the way in which the locution is spoken that might give us the basis of the meaning behind the locution. To clarify this, it may be a certain emphasis on a word that could change the meaning. If, for example, I was talking about general things and someone warned me that “Billy has left the room” it could be that I want to say something about Billy, or to go after him. However, if I was talking and someone said “Billy has left the room”, the emphasis on the name particularly might be a suggestion that I have offended Billy to make him leave, and so I feel guilty and am persuaded to apologise. Or perhaps that I am warned that Billy has left the room when I am complaining about someone doing something, and so am to assume that he is guilty.
The information here should not be anything new to anyone. The ideas about the way in which something is being said changing the meaning behind what is being said is a skill we naturally pick up through language from a very young age. When a parent says something sternly as to be annoyed or disappointed, the child learns that they should amend what they've done, or simply not do it again, despite that not being what was actually necessarily said. Though, this does give an idea to how deep context goes, and, as a result, it seems all kinds of sentences have the potential to motivate. The way things are said seem to have a bearing into the effect they have on the listener, and, as a result, it does not seem factual statements are exempt from this.
How about, then, a more general fact? One that seems to simply be an assertion about the world, that has little bearing to situations, and, therefore, would seem not to be able to motivate. Consider the utterance “Diamonds are made out of carbon.” It would seem that this is simply a statement of fact, and would scarcely be said outside of the situation of teaching, or information giving. Perhaps teaching is a speech act in itself that can be considered:
    A) “Diamonds are made out of carbon.”
    B) They urged me to understand what diamonds are made from.
    C1) I learned (remembered) that diamonds are made from carbon.
    C2) I repeated this information to others; I was inspired to learn more about geology; I turned my grandfather's ashes into a diamond ring.
So with this speech act, it seems that the illocution was not actually an intentional motivation to action, but merely an urging to learn. How I was motivated to act, however, could change due to my circumstance, as with all the other examples. It could be that this fact may have been something that the speaker knew I would find fascinating, and, therefore, intended to impress me with the information, and simply as something for me to know. The perlocution, however, was that I was so interested that I went to find out more about diamonds, or geology in general, to find out what things are made from. It seems to be a safe assumption about teaching that all givers of information are urging you to remember or understand that information. In an education situation, it could be suggested that they are advising you to remember the information so that you may produce it in an exam. All of these can also be illocutions for other general facts about the world when used to pass on information, so with effect of teaching facts, there still seems to be motivations inherently linked to speech acts. Even so, it seems we could find a specific situation where the fact may be used, in most cases, with the intention of motivation. Given that I have been told by a friend that diamonds are made out of carbon when talking about my grandfather having died, and I did not know what to do with the ashes. The illocutionary force may well be, in this case, to persuade me to turn those ashes into a diamond ring, and the perlocutionary effect could be that I do carry this out.
With all three of these examples showing the different sides to facts, it seems that all facts have the potential to motivate in many similar ways to evaluations, while it is true that both of these also can potentially not motivate. It does seem, however, that not only is it becoming unclear as to what the difference is between factual statements and evaluative statements, but language seems to hold much importance to the way we speak, to whom we are speaking, and how we say what we have said. It seems that of all locutions, there is potentially a motivational force and a motivated effect. As a result, Mackie must have been wrong in his assertion that 'there are no moral facts' – because if facts can motivate just as much as evaluations, then it is through the illocution of all assertions that we may have the intention of suggesting 'you ought or ought not do this'.
The fact / value distinction, at this point, is weak, if at all still holding on to existence. So what can we do to break this down further? Well, let us look at this notion that we can suggest 'ought' through 'is' – or rather moral evaluations through factual statements – this weakens the notions of objectivity and subjectivity, which is what Mackie seems to be basing his distinction on. Perhaps, though, we suggest that that there are still factual statements, and they are objective, thought we may say that it is only through the intention behind the locution that makes a factual statement seem like an evaluative statement. We could also suggest that it is the people involved in evaluative statements that make them not motivating, but they are still emotive and subjective. Well then, in order to avoid this line of thought, in the next section, I shall argue against alternative lines of argument that blend the fact / value distinction, and show how they are no different to what we have found so far.



Chapter 4: Changing the distinction
Much of the ideas of a fact / value distinction relies on the ideas of values being morally motivating, and seeing as values are said to be subjective, the suggestion of Mackie seems to be that there are no truths in morality. While, in many moral acts, this does seem to work, such as lying, violence, murder, kindness, generosity, speeding, trespassing and so on, which all have situations that change whether they are acceptable or not, so not set in absolutes, is it correct to suggest there are no objective morals?
Philippa Foot suggests, of Mackie's notion of facts and values, that perhaps there is a third type of sentence which, in a sense, breaks the distinction – and that is a blending of both facts and values. That is to say that Foot claims there are statements that are still facts, but also motivating (Foot, 1958). She does this by explaining the notion of 'rudeness is bad', and that to use the word is different to actually meaning the word, as even though rudeness is different to many people, we are still all using the same criteria for what 'rudeness' actually is. If, then, someone can think 'I am acting rudely' when they know the situation does not actually satisfy the condition for 'rudeness', they are wrong about this. So, it seems that with 'rudeness' there is a right and a wrong. Foot suggests this must be 'a non-evaluative premise from which an evaluative conclusion can be deduced' vis-á-vis a fact that motivates.
Foot's suggestion that morals motivate and her criteria for the notion that some morals are objective does seem to make sense, however, she still seems to be using this fact / value distinction and adhering to it's rules, even if she is simply creating a third category. So with this in mind, we might be able to use Austin's notion of a speech act to examine this possibility that an evaluative-fact exists. If it were that there was simply this third category, perhaps, then, there are facts and values but also a mix of the two and the distinction can still be used to explain utterance types but on a much looser basis than the clear distinction. For this, then, we will need to examine utterances that are clearly objective facts that are still capable of motivating. Foot's example of 'rudeness is bad', however, seems to be a problematic example as I could easily suggest that it would not exactly be a bad thing to be rude to people who do not deserve your respect (tyrannical dictators for example). It is accepted, though, by many philosophers, that the idea of 'cruelty' is an objectively bad thing, such as rape or torturing someone for fun. 'Cruelty' being defined as any act that intentionally causes unnecessary harm, seems to always be bad. This is because we consider pain to be generally bad, so unnecesscary pain is always bad, and 'cruelty' specifies that the act is both intentional and that the victim does not deserve the harm coming to them. So with this we can say:
    A) “Cruelty is bad.”
    B) They urge me not to be cruel.
    C1) I am persuaded that cruelty is bad.
    C2) I avoid being cruel.
Now, seeing as cruelty is objectively bad, to say “Cruelty is bad”, is a fact, because it is an assertion that fits with either being true of false (as it would be false for anyone to suggest that cruelty is good), and yet it has an 'evaluative' conclusion. In this example, if someone accepts that cruelty is bad, and then is making a cheese sandwich and thinks 'this is cruel and therefore bad' they would be making a mistake, as in order for something to be cruel it has the fit the criteria for 'being cruel'. Also, if someone were to be stabbing innocent people on the street and thinks 'this is cruel and therefore good', they are also making a mistake because cruelty cannot be good. So there would be specific criteria by which something being cruel (and therefore bad) would fit and by uttering “cruelty is bad” you are almost always urging people not to act in such a way that could be defined as cruel. If the speaker is someone to be trusted, then, the perlocutionary effect of uttering the locution is that people learn not to be cruel.
Though, despite cruelty being bad and by asserting 'Cruelty is bad.' you are urging the listener not to be cruel, could it also not motivate? If an evil person decided to bring up a child and told it that 'cruelty is good', that the speaker is likely to be trusted would be urging the child to be cruel, and the effect is likely that the child will be cruel to things if they do not learn otherwise. So, then, if someone were to incorrectly believe that cruelty is good and someone they do not trust at all asserts that 'cruelty is bad', they seem unlikely to just accept the notion as they are likely to think they are making a mistake about this. The context of the 'speech act' puts this idea of a potentially motivating fact as no different to regular facts, and also regular evaluations. So the idea here is that all of these statements seem to be the same type of sentence – one that dependent on the context can potentially motivate, but also potentially not motivate. With this, we can suggest that while Foot was trying to disregard Mackie's idea of there being no moral facts, she still used notions of facts and values to attempt to do so, and so it would be better if we did not have this distinction at all.
Here, though, all I have shown is that there are criterion for objective moral acts and that, via the speech act, they seem not to be any different to any other type of fact or value. So let us attempt to disregard any notion of the fact / value distinction left with some examples of much more complicated utterances so show that potentially all language seems to fit under similar a criteria as the examples I have already used.
    A) I said to myself:  “Congratulating Barry is the right thing to do.”
    B) I committed myself to congratulating Barry.
    C1) I persuaded myself to congratulate Barry; I could not commit to congratulating Barry.
    C2) I congratulate Barry; I do not congratulate Barry.
In this example, if Barry had done nothing particularly wrong and had just got married, for example, to congratulate him would be the kind thing to do, seeing as kindness has certain criteria. So by my own standards, congratulating Barry is actually the right thing to do, because to me, being kind is a good thing. So I decide to commit myself to doing this act and, when I next see Barry, I congratulate him. This, as a speech act to one's self, sits in the same motivations as speech acts from other people, because it is still a motivating thing. Perhaps, if I had not reminded myself or committed to it, I may have forgotten and not carried out the action. Though, perhaps I simply have a strong dislike for Barry, but for no particular reason. I still may be able to objectively suggest to myself “congratulating Barry is the right thing to do” and commit to doing this, though when it actually came to meeting Barry, my distaste towards him means I could not bring myself to congratulate him, despite it being the right thing to do.
This is much more complicated for a few reasons, firstly, to congratulate someone is an illocution in itself, so it may be that in congratulating someone you do not say the words 'congratulations', but rather something else that they accept as a congratulation. Secondly, it is being said to yourself, so it might not necessarily have been said out loud, but the locution still stands as part of the speech act as the idea of it still follows with an illocution and a perlocution. Thirdly, even though kindness is not necessarily an objective notion, people still have some of their own moral standards, so to say 'X is the right thing to do' to yourself may still be a fact, as you genuinely believe that G is always good, and X fits the criteria of G. Despite this being very different to all the previous examples and fits under the category of a 'factual-evaluation' by Mackie and Foot's definitions – it seems to be no different to the others, it can potentially motivate and also not motivate depending largely on the context.
As a last example then:
    A) My teacher told me that my argument was both valid and sound but irrelevant to the topic I was discussing.
    B) My teacher both condemned and criticised my argument.
    C1) I was persuaded that my argument was a good argument but also that there were problems with my argument with regards to relevancy.
    C2) I decided to change my argument to make it more relevant to the topic; I kept my argument how it was but tried to persuade my teacher that it is relevant to the topic.
This example is one that is still someone talking to themselves, but paraphrasing someone else, it does also seem that an argument being valid and sound seems to be factual, and an argument being irrelevant seems factual, but considering this is an idea coming from a teacher the intention is to be motivated to change their argument so that it either is relevant or to explain why it is relevant, etc.
This example, again, is both factual and evaluative, and the idea remains the same. For someone to use a locution based on something their teacher told them, it is simply stating a fact, but also the reason this is being considered is because I am trying to find a way to change my work. So the locution is very much motivating, even though the example is based on 'facts' (it is a fact my teacher said this and it's a fact that something is valid and sound and it is a fact that something is irrelevant), and in this example the motivation comes from the way in which I will change my work. If, however, I disliked the teacher or simply thought my teacher was wrong it would stand to reason that I would (albeit arrogantly) refuse to change my irrelevant argument.
Even when trying to break the fact value distinction by merging them together or try to find utterances that change what the distinction is, it seems that all utterances do seem to fall under the same type of sentence which is not one of facts or values or even both, but something entirely different.



Chapter 5: There is no distinction
Using John Austin's speech acts, I have shown that even the locutions that seem as if they do not have an illocutionary force and a perlocutionary effect, in fact, do have both of these. This is because given the context of an utterance, there will always be a meaning behind what was being said, and that meaning will either motivate the hearer or not motivate the hearer. As a result, all speech has the potential to motivate. When language is viewed in this way, it does not seem plausible to make a distinction between sentence types based on them being objective, subjective, motivating or not motivating as all sentences are just sentences and not certain kinds of sentences. So, Mackie must have been wrong when he claimed that there are no moral facts, and Austin does show the fact / value distinction to be nothing more than nonsense. Furthermore, a fundamentally important aspect that Austin's speech acts shows us is that language is far more complicated than Mackie and Hume have previously suggested, and this is certainly something worthy of note.
Understanding this will be important for moral philosophy as, as Austin pointed out, many philosophers have made mistakes due to accepting the fact / value distinction. To use context allows us to understand moral language more accurately, and in future theories we would not have to be restricted by the ideas of facts and evaluations as philosophers have done for the past two-hundred and fifty years. While people such as Philippa Foot tried to show problems with the fact / value distinction, none have displayed a method such as Austin to completely abolish it. As a result of Austin, it seems that we may begin accepting his notion of speech acts and form new moral theories under his influence rather than relying on the things suggested by Hume.
With regards to the use of speech acts in everyday language, it seems important to understand that the things we say have an effect on other people, and when we consider that everything we say can potentially move them in certain kinds of ways, it seems that things like advice giving likely have a more profound effect than we realise. These notions of motivations suggest that in everyday life we may be able to make basic observations and not ignore them simply as assertions, but rather as understanding the meanings behind them. For example, if someone was to make the observation 'you're wearing green' to someone else, it is possible they meant it as a compliment or an insult or something else entirely based on the context of the situation and the way they said it. Perhaps, if said on St Patrick's day, it would be an acknowledgement that they are celebrating the day. Alternatively, the idea could be that they made the observation with the advice of them wearing green more often, or less often, etc. To assume they were simply making a statement, with knowledge of illocutions, seems to be a bizarre notion. When we know that simple assertions and facts can actually mean things in everyday language, more than the utterance itself, we may even have the effect of understanding people better, or having the influence we desire to have on other people, or even ourselves.
When we make locutions, it is possible to analyse potential illocutions to figure out what it is we actually are trying to say, as oppose to just analysing the utterance itself. In practices such as teaching or counselling the giving of advice is a core part, so it may be beneficial for us to understand what advice we may take when someone utters a fact, how we might use the information we are being given, or even for the speaker to say the right things to have the right effect. With the use of speech acts, we can have a clearer basis that not all of our opinions are going to move others and that not all facts are simple assertions, but rather all of the things we say can potentially motivate others into acting in certain ways.
John Austin does seem to play the devil with Mackie and Hume's fact / value distinction, and the abolition of this makes a change that Austin suggests could be one of the biggest revolutions in modern philosophy. As a result of Austin we know that language is much more complicated than most people have suggested thus far. By being able to understand language better, without basing our ideas on false theories, we may write about philosophy and understand philosophy more accurately, so it does not seem to be too much of an overestimation to say that this is a big deal. With motivations being so core to the ways in which we act, then, the use of speech acts can more accurately make sense of our motivations than any other method. So, with the lack of a fact / value distinction it may be possible for someone, perhaps a logician, to place a more accurate theory instead, and if so, they would need to build it around the idea of speech acts.



References:
・     Austin, J. L, (1962). How To Do Things With Words. Clarendon Press: Oxford.
・     Foot, P, (1958). Moral Arguments. Mind. 268 (4), pp.502 – 514
・    Gingell, J; Winch, C, (2008). Philosophy of education. The Key Concepts. 2nd Ed. Routledge: Oxford.
・    Hume, D, (1739) A Treatise Of Human Nature (1896 ed.) Clarendon Press: Oxford.
・    Mackie, J. L. (1977). Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Penguin: London.

・    Searle, J. R. (1975), “A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts”, in: Günderson, K. (ed.), Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 7, University of Minneapolis Press, p. 344-69.