Dissertation Sample

Does John Austin Play Old Harry With The Fact / Value Distinction?

An investigation into the moral motivations of language.

Kyle Michael Sweet

April 2014

I, Kyle Michael Sweet, declare that all work found within this paper is composed by myself, and that the presented work is that of my own.

All work which is not entirely my own has been referenced in accordance with the system demanded by the university of Northampton.

Date: 23 / 04 / 2014

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Does John Austin Play Old Harry With The Fact / Value Distinction?

An investigation into the moral motivations of language.

Chapter 1: Motivations and John Austin

It is not only worthy of note, but rather a necessity in understanding human actions, that our motivations are at the core of everything we do. With regard to this, it is completely within reason for testimony to be the greatest motivational force, for we wholeheartedly rely on the testimony of those we trust by means of advice, education and welfare in our everyday lives. The giving and taking of advice plays a fundamental place in such everyday things (i.e. friendships, professional practices, parenting, and so on), that nobody seems to be exempt from the influence of others. Predominantly, it seems to be the intention of giving advice that the person takes that advice and, therefore, carry out the advice given (Winch; Gingell: 2008). Even those in such a remote setting as a solitary hunter-gatherer tribe would learn by means of others when to stop running after a creature or which berries not to eat, despite nearly having caught the creature, or being very hungry, if it were not to benefit them. I believe it to be implausible for anyone from any walk of life to survive very long, or at least lead a healthy life, by purely relying on base desires and uninfluenced reason alone as their motivations.

It would seem, then, that it would be of great use to have a grasp on the notion of motivational language, and more precisely, the kinds of things that motivate and the kinds of things that do not. An understanding of this would benefit us both philosophically, by understanding morals, and professionally, in practices such as medicine, counselling or teaching.
It has been proposed for some time now, beginning with Hume, that there is a distinction between facts and values (Hume: 1739). The explanations of these two types of sentence largely cause the disparity between the sciences and ethics. The idea is that factual statements are assertions that can be true or can be false, and, evaluative statements cannot be true or false but are merely utterances, such as expressions of emotions or exclamations.

Hume gives his account of evaluations as coming from the passions and are neither true nor false - they are distinctly about emotions and do not involve reason. Hume reflects that it is these evaluations that would move us, as rationality and reason on their own are incapable of moving us at all. Though, as much of a bold statement as this is, Hume seems not to offer any real defence of this case, but rather leaving it on the note that moral evaluations are not things that are about the world. It appears, however, to have almost been an after-thought in his explanations upon morality that there is any real separation between 'is / is not' and 'ought / ought not' (which is very much the same distinction, with facts being 'is / is not' and evaluations being 'ought / ought not'), as he claims to have observed that many philosophers seem to have confused one for the other. This appears as a small paragraph whereby he explains that of reading people who speak of morality, they seem to begin with ideas of 'is', that give explanation, and end in making the claims of 'ought', that require explanation. This single paragraph has caused much influence and is truly the only place he actually suggests the idea of a clear fact / value distinction. From Hume, it is suggested as the 'is-ought problem'. This has largely influenced the basis of moral thinking for the past two-hundred and fifty years, stemming all kinds of explanations and theories.

While influential as an idea, it did not seem to be a thing of much importance to Hume, and so J. L. Mackie was one of the major philosophers who built upon this to make a clear and important distinction between facts and values (Mackie: 1977). Seeing it as a truly moral issue, Mackie asserted 'there are no moral facts' in which he seems to be clarifying the distinction further between the two proposed types of sentences, using the ideas of objectivity and subjectivity. The claim here is that all evaluative statements are subjective, and all factual statements are objective; this is because facts are about truths and falsities, and so they are not emotive, as values are. As, he claims, there are no truths in morality; all moral statements are emotive and, therefore, can motivate, while there can be no moral facts on the basis that factual statements cannot motivate.

This distinction is still an idea that remains today, even though it seems to cause philosophical problems as John Austin points out in the book 'How To Do things With Words' (A collection of lectures by Austin, formed into a book, by J. O. Urmson). Austin makes this bold claim in the opening lecture about the fact / value distinction, which he calls the 'descriptive fallacy' (The notion of when someone mistakes value utterances as statements). He suggests that many philosophers have made "the mistake of taking, as straightforward statements of fact, utterances which are either nonsensical or else something entirely different" (Austin: 1955). The claim here is to suggest that philosophers often took too much from the ideas of sentences as statements, and have not been recognising the possibility of types of sentences that are not facts and have no intention of trying to be facts. This is one issue brought about by the fact / value distinction, as the idea that a philosopher is capable of analysing any sentence as if it is a statement of fact, and so even evaluative statements seem to be sometimes considered as opinions trying to be facts, which, according to Austin, is a mistake. Rather, Austin seems to be suggesting that there is a problem with a separation between such distinctions as facts and values. This is because nobody can truly analyse utterances as straightforward statements of fact; including 'facts', as there are other things to consider, such as context, which gets largely ignored by philosophers in the analysis of language.

Reading further into Austin's lectures, however, it becomes largely apparent that he never actually addresses this issue that he seems to claim is there. Despite suggesting that the changing tide of this could be an important revolution in philosophy, at no point does he make the link clear between what he is trying to say and how it disproves ideas such as the fact / value distinction. However, this is not necessarily the fault of Austin, as upon his death he had not finished his lectures, and it could have been entirely possible that his connection was a lecture yet to come. Though, through the fate of his death, these ideas still deserve to be built upon, and not simply abandoned.

As a result, my intention here is simply to explain this link and show, quite clearly, how Austin's notions of speech acts do, in fact, play old harry (the devil) with the fact / value distinction, to the extent that it simply cannot be a plausible idea and needs to be abolished. We need to get beyond this oversimplification of moral language that has been hanging over philosophy for so long. Having already reflected upon the importance of this matter and the benefit of doing so, it should be further explained that Austin's ideas, while strong, offer no comprehensive explanation to the possible types of sentences – he merely shows language up in its complex nature. In this explanation, it is still left open for anyone else to offer an alternative notion to a language distinction that makes more sense than the fact / value, as that is not something I will be offering myself. I shall be arguing for the notion that language is much more complicated than is suggested by simplistic notions of a two, or even three or four, category distinction. Before, though, I continue on in explaining the details of Austin's work, I shall explain, upfront, and be clear on exactly how Austin's work does show up the fact / value distinction as nothing more than nonsense, and thus avoiding the similar fate in never fully explaining myself.

In pointing out the basis for the problems caused by a descriptive fallacy, Austin reflects on the idea that philosophers are an all too serious bunch who have taken the ideas of sentences too much as statements, and, as a result, have ignored the concept of context. In pointing this out, he proposes new ideas that attempt to explain not only what has been uttered, but also the intention behind what is being uttered and the possible effect that has on the receiver of the utterance. With this explanation, Austin does two things that cause major issues for the fact / value distinction. Firstly, he shows that it is entirely possible to have facts that motivate, values that do not motivate and also other possible sentence types that also can motivate or not motivate. This fades the definitions between facts and values, showing that they both seem to be the same thing. Secondly, he shows that language is more complicated than the meanings of sentences, as there are many variables in someone saying something that means it would be difficult to define any sentence as a set of categories, i.e. facts or values.